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Abstract 
Emotions guide the way individuals interact with the world, influencing nearly 
every psychological process from attention, to learning, to metacognition. 
Constructionist models of emotion posit that emotions arise out of combinations of more 
general psychological ingredients. These psychological ingredients, however, also form 
the building blocks of other affective responses such as subjective reactions to rewarding 
and social stimuli. Here, I propose a domain-general account of affective functioning; I 
contend that subjective responses to emotional, rewarding, and social stimuli all depend 
on common psychological and neural mechanisms. I support this hypothesis with three 
independent studies using both a basic science approach and a clinical approach. In the 
first study (Chapter 2) I demonstrate that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
which has been implicated in encoding the value of primary, monetary, and social 
rewards, also encodes the hedonic value of emotional stimuli. In addition to showing 
that the mechanisms responsible for processing affective information are shared across 
reward and emotional processing, I also discuss the relevance of a domain-general 
constructionist account of affect for clinical disorders. In particular, I hypothesize that in 
anorexia nervosa (AN), affective disturbances should be manifest across responses to 
emotional, rewarding, and social stimuli (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, I provide empirical 
evidence for this conclusion by demonstrating that when viewing social stimuli, women 
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with a history of AN show disturbances in the insula, a brain region that is responsible 
for interoceptive and affective processing. This suggests that the interpersonal 
difficulties frequently observed in patients with AN may be due to biases in domain-
general affective responses. In Chapter 5, I support this conclusion by showing that 
individual differences in harm avoidance in healthy women, women with a current 
diagnosis of AN, and women who have recovered from AN explain the relationship 
between disordered eating and social dysfunction. Collectively, these results indicate 
that subjective affective responses to rewarding, emotional, and social information all 
rely on common mechanisms as would be suggested by a domain-general theory of 
affect. Furthermore, the application of a constructionist domain-general account of affect 
can help to explain the fundamental nature of affective disturbances in psychiatric 
disorders such as AN.   
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1. Mechanisms of Domain-General Affective Processing 
Emotions lie at the heart of what it means to be human. They guide our attention, 
transform our memory, and influence what decisions we make. Philosophical 
descriptions of emotion can be found in the works of Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Hume 
and numerous others (de Sousa, 2014). Moreover, scientists such as William James and 
Carl Lange provided early conceptual models of emotion more than a hundred years 
ago (Cannon, 1927). Despite this rich history and the substantial progress that has been 
made, emotion is still relatively poorly understood, in part due to the methodological 
difficulties inherent in quantifying it, but also because of the difficulty of defining it.  
Though definitions of emotion vary somewhat, most contend that emotion is 
comprised of physiological reactions, subjective feeling states, and behavioral reactions 
that in combination, prepare an organism to react appropriately to salient stimuli in the 
environment. Further, emotions involve appraisals both before and during the 
experience of a feeling state (Izard, 2010). This definition, while helpful in identifying 
some of the features of emotional responding, could easily be applied to a host of related 
constructs. Motivation, a construct that is sometimes differentiated from emotion 
(Stellar, 1954), also involves physiological responses, subjective cognitions or feelings, 
action tendencies, and cognitive interpretations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
boundaries that differentiate emotion from other related constructs move, blur or 
disappear altogether depending on who is drawing them. As scientists, we must isolate 
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a phenomenon of interest in order to study it. These attempts to compartmentalize 
psychological functions into distinct categories are no doubt necessary for experimental 
progress; however, they are also responsible for the seemingly arbitrary boundaries that 
separate highly interrelated processes. Focusing on the distinctions between related 
psychological and neural processes may prevent us from discovering the more 
fundamental properties underlying them. 
As one example of this problem, emotion, reward processing, and social 
functioning are often studied in isolation, yet they share many common features. A 
guided investigation of the basic psychological and neural properties that are shared 
among these processes could yield new insights into where these domains overlap and 
whether they diverge, thereby improving our understanding of both domain-general as 
well as domain-specific affective processes. Existing models of emotion offer a useful 
starting point for beginning such an investigation. Much empirical and theoretic work 
has fed into the development of models of emotion, and discourse about the strengths 
and weaknesses of these various models has been prolific. Here, I will give an overview 
of three major classes of models for emotion—categorical models, constructionist 
models, and survival circuit animal models—and I will review some of the evidence that 
has been used to support and contest each. Out of these three models, the constructionist 
framework is the most relevant for understanding commonalities among emotion, 
reward, and social processing; therefore, I will focus the remainder of the chapter 
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considering the application of the constructionist model across domains.  I will review 
existing literature suggesting that core affect and conceptualization, which are main 
elements of constructionist models of emotion (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012), are manifest 
in neural responses across reward, emotional, and social functioning. I will then present 
some of the ways in which the theory that the brain encodes domain-general affective 
properties can be tested.  
1.1 Contemporary Theories of Human Emotion 
Throughout the history of psychology there has been much debate on the nature 
and genesis of emotion. Theories of human emotion typically fall into two camps, those 
proposing a categorical account of emotion and those proposing a constructionist one. 
Categorical models posit that a handful of emotions or emotional behaviors are “basic.” 
That is, these emotions do not arise out of combinations of more general psychological 
processes, but are themselves distinct and fundamental psychological responses 
(Ekman, 1992). The vast array of complex emotions experienced by humans are built 
from combinations of these basic emotions and interactions with cultural learning and 
context (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Tomkins & Mccarter, 1964).  
Though the existence of so-called basic emotions does not necessarily imply that 
these emotions have evolutionary relevance (see Parkinson, 1996), most categorical 
models are grounded in evolutionary explanations (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992). Often 
categorical theories trace their origin back to Darwin, who described some of the 
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characteristic features of specific emotional responses across species in The Expression of 
Emotion in Man and Animals (Darwin, 1872/2009). Though there has been some debate as 
to whether Darwin’s work truly aligns with what categorical emotion theorists claim 
today (Barrett, 2011), a key element of many categorical theories is that stereotyped 
physiological and behavioral responses evolved for each of the basic emotions because 
these response sets promoted adaptive behavior in response to particular environmental 
circumstances (Izard, 1992). It should follow then that basic emotions will be associated 
with distinct autonomic (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) or neural profiles (Izard, 1992; Izard, 
2011; Vytal & Hamann, 2010) as well as distinct outward expressions and precipitating 
conditions (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992; Izard, 2011).   
Perhaps the best known basic emotion model is the one posited by Paul Ekman 
(Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Ekman, 1992). In a recent review, Ekman & Cordaro (Ekman & 
Cordaro, 2011) detailed the thirteen properties that collectively determine whether a 
particular emotional response can be considered “basic.” These properties concern an 
emotional response’s distinctiveness in experience and expression, automaticity, 
presence in non-human primates, and brief duration. Based on these features, Ekman 
and Cordaro conclude that there are seven basic emotions: anger, fear, surprise, sadness, 
disgust, contempt, and happiness. In this model, they argue that delineating these basic 
emotions does not mean that every response within each basic emotion category must be 
identical. Instead, the basic emotions are best construed as “families” that share 
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expression, physiology, and precipitating events. Experiences within the emotion family 
of happiness, therefore, may be subject to some variation based on exactly what 
provoked the emotion, whether it occurred spontaneously or in response to an external 
stimulus, or whether it is being subjected to emotion regulation. Despite this variation 
within a family, Ekman and Cordaro contend that the boundaries between emotion 
families are firm and non-overlapping. Thus, emotion families can be considered basic 
and distinct psychological phenomena. 
As evidence for this perspective, Ekman and Friesen (1969) demonstrated that 
participants in the United States, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile all associated the 
same facial configuration with the same emotion label. Moreover, in a follow-up study  
(1971) these same authors found that preliterate participants in New Guinea who had 
little to no exposure to Western media associated the same facial expressions used in the 
previous study with particular emotional scenarios designed to elicit the associated 
emotion (i.e., they associated the sad facial expression from Ekman and Friesen (1969) 
with sadness evoking stories). Thus, the recognition of these emotions is neither 
culturally learned nor dependent on written language. In addition to evidence for 
universal recognition of basic emotion expressions, there is evidence that particular 
states of the autonomic nervous system differentiate the basic emotions. Levenson, 
Ekman, and Friesen (1990) measured skin conductance, heart rate, and finger 
temperature while participants voluntarily configured their facial expressions to match 
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basic emotional expressions. Results indicated that autonomic profiles were distinct for 
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. Moreover, when participants 
manipulated their facial muscles to match a basic emotional expression, this triggered an 
experience of the congruent emotion on around 50% of trials. Ekman & Cordaro (2011) 
note that these particular response profiles seem to promote adaptive behavior, lending 
support to the theory that basic emotion categories evolved as a result of their specific 
survival benefit. For example, they note that anger increases blood flow to the hands and 
arms, which would potentially prepare an organism to fight whereas fear increases 
blood flow to the legs and feet, which would prepare an organism for flight.  
 While Ekman’s model has been highly influential, other variants of categorical 
models exist. The model posited by Caroll Izard (Izard, 1992; Izard, 2011) is also broadly 
consistent with a categorical conceptualization of emotion. In his model, certain 
emotional responses are deemed “first order.” These first-order responses, like basic 
emotions, are discrete from one another, are evolutionarily based, occur early in 
development, and do not necessitate complex cognitive processing. Based on these 
criteria, Izard claims that first-order emotions include interest, joy, sadness, anger, and 
fear. These emotions, which are primarily experienced in their pure form only during 
infancy and early childhood, are contrasted with “emotion schemas,” which occur 
within conscious awareness and are the product of interactions between first-order 
feelings and complex higher order cognition. Izard’s model contends that each of the 
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first-order or basic emotions has a distinct representation in the brain (Izard, 1992; Izard, 
2011).  
In keeping with these ideas, there have been several recent attempts to elucidate 
the response profiles associated with discrete basic emotions. In one meta-analysis, 
Lench, Flores and Beech (2011) aggregated across studies examining happiness, sadness, 
anger and anxiety to test for evidence of separable responses in terms of cognitions, 
behavior, subjective experience, and physiology. The effect sizes of differences between 
emotion categories were examined across the 510 articles included in the sample. The 
authors found evidence for a medium effect size associated with comparisons of 
emotion categories. In contrast, they found only weak evidence supporting the idea that 
emotions occur along continua of valence and arousal. Meta-analytic techniques have 
also been used to examine neuroimaging evidence for categorical theories of emotion. 
Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), Vytal and Hamann (2010) examined the 
main effects of neural activation in response to fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and 
happiness as well as the differences between each emotion category. Both the main 
effects analysis and the contrasts revealed some differences in the neural profiles 
associated with each emotion. Based on these results, the authors concluded that 
existing neuroimaging literature provided broad support for the theory that basic 
emotions are associated with distinct neural profiles.  
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These conclusions, however, do not seem entirely in keeping the results from the 
Vytal & Hamann’s analysis. Notably, in the main effects analysis, there is overlapping 
activation in the insula for fear, anger, and disgust. Similarly, there are overlapping 
activations in the medial prefrontal cortex in the main effects maps for happiness and 
fear. Furthermore, in the contrast analysis, different regions appear as a result of each 
emotion-by-emotion comparison. Though a basic emotion account does not necessarily 
presume that a single emotion must map to a single region of the brain, it does presume 
that at the very least the same profile of activation should be consistently activated in 
response to each category, and that these profiles should be distinct. In this study, that 
the maps associated with each emotion varied considerably depending on the 
comparison point suggests that this is not the case.  
The meta-analysis performed by Lench, Flores, and Bench (2011) is also flawed, 
and has been criticized as providing insufficient evidence to claim support for a 
categorical account of emotion. Lindquist and colleagues (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & 
Barrett, 2013) argue that to test for evidence of discrete emotional responses, Lench, 
Flores and Bench would need to demonstrate that responses to basic emotion categories 
were both specific and consistent. Because they only tested for the magnitude of 
differences between responses to emotion categories (indicating little about the nature of 
the response), their analysis does neither. That is, it is not sufficient to claim that there is 
a difference in galvanic skin response between sadness and happiness. Instead, 
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consistent differences between these emotions in the timing, magnitude, or shape of the 
response across many studies would be necessary to claim that the response profiles are 
truly distinct. 
Such critiques of categorical emotion theories serve as the rallying cry of 
constructionist emotion theorists. Constructionist theories of emotion postulate that 
emotions do not fall into discrete categories, but rather are psychological events that 
emerge out of domain-general psychological ingredients (Gendron & Barrett, 2009;  
Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012;  
Lindquist, 2013). Exactly what ingredients are included in the recipe depends on the 
theory; however, most constructionist theories include some variant of three basic 
elements: hedonic value, arousal, and interpretation (Lindquist, 2013). The hedonic 
value of an emotional reaction accounts for the valence of an emotional stimulus or 
subjective experience (i.e., whether the stimulus or experience is pleasant or unpleasant). 
The arousal element of emotion captures the intensity or magnitude of an emotional 
response. Much as the absolute value of 100 and -100 is the same, the arousal level 
associated with profound joy and despair may be similar despite opposite hedonic 
direction. Lastly, the subjective experience of emotion is also dependent on how 
meaning is ascribed to hedonic and arousal responses.  
These elements form the basis of the constructionist model proposed by Lisa 
Feldman Barrett and colleagues. In this model, emotion is comprised of two main 
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ingredients, core affect and conceptualization. Core affect is defined as, “the mental 
representation of bodily changes that are sometimes experienced as feelings of hedonic 
pleasure or displeasure with some degree of arousal” (Lindquist et al., 2012). Core affect 
is associated with fluctuations in bodily state in the periphery, which are represented in 
the brain. These changes in core affective responses interact with conceptualization, which 
ties together external sensory inputs with internal core affective reactions by taking 
advantage of knowledge about the world and prior experience. Conceptualization helps 
individuals to categorize what are otherwise abstract affective reactions by allowing 
them to attend to certain elements of an experience while disregarding others (Barrett, 
2006; Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). To do this, humans employ language, episodic 
memory, and executive attention to make predictions about their own emotional states 
as well as the emotional states of others (Lindquist et al., 2012).  
As one of the many studies Lindquist, Barrett and colleagues have performed to 
support this model (e.g., Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & 
Aronson, 2004; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006; Oosterwijk et al., 2012), 
Lindquist et al., (2012) performed an extensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging 
literature to determine whether regions or networks encoded these psychological 
ingredients rather than discrete emotional responses. Though the results identified 
neural regions consistently activated with each emotion, they did not find evidence that 
neural profiles for each basic emotion were distinguishable. The authors interpreted 
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these findings as evidence that emotions are constructed out of more fundamental 
psychological ingredients that in particular combination produce specific emotional 
responses. Results from this study complement findings from a previous analysis (Kober 
et al., 2008) in which the authors did not separate studies based on the specific emotions 
being studied, but looked for the emergence of functional networks across studies of 
emotion more generally. This analysis identified six networks that the authors 
concluded were involved in the basic processes that collectively make up emotion. Two 
networks (core limbic and paralimbic) were implicated in core affect, two networks 
(medial prefrontal and medial posterior) were implicated in conceptualization, one 
cognitive/motor network was implicated in executive attention and language processes, 
and one network primarily made up of occipital regions was implicated in visual 
processing.  
1.2 Survival Circuit Animal Models of Emotion 
The theories and research discussed thus far in this chapter have primarily focused 
on the experience, expression, and fundamental properties of human emotions. Yet 
animal models have contributed to scientific understanding of emotion and emotional 
behaviors by identifying processes that are conserved in other species and by pointing to 
the potential evolutionary function of emotional processes. Jaak Panksepp (Panksepp & 
Watt, 2011; Panksepp, 2005, 2011) has proposed such a model, drawing on insights and 
data primarily derived from his own and others’ work in animals. Though his model has 
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been classified as a variant of a categorical theory (Barrett, 2011), it differs from human 
categorical models in important ways. First, Panksepp parses emotional processes into 
hierarchical levels, with “primary processes” (core affect) arising from survival-relevant 
responses in evolutionarily old subcortical structures, “secondary processes” 
(elaborations) arising from classical and instrumental conditioning, and “tertiary 
processes” (emotions) arising from the complex interactions among aspects of the 
neocortex, limbic, and paralimbic structures. In contrast to Lindquist and Barrett’s 
definition of core affect (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012), Panksepp posits seven core affective 
processes with dedicated neural circuits: “seeking” or appetitive drives guiding foraging 
behaviors, “fear” or basic defensive responses such as flight or freezing, “rage” or 
responses related to competition for resources, “lust” or sexual drives, “care” or 
nurturing responses, “panic/grief” or responses to separation, and “play” or social 
responses associated with amusement. According to Panksepp, these core affective 
processes and their associated neural circuitries arose because the response 
implemented by each conveys adaptive value. For example, when juvenile rats engage 
in what appears to be playful behavior (e.g., wrestling, chasing), they emit ultrasonic 
vocalizations (Knutson, Burgdorf, & Panksepp, 1998). The same pattern of vocal 
responses can be elicited by electrical brain stimulation, which rats will voluntarily 
engage in, and when a human experimenter “tickles” a research rat (Burgdorf, Wood, 
Kroes, Moskal, & Panksepp, 2007). Pankseep has used this evidence to claim that rats 
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engage in play behavior (Siviy & Panksepp, 2011) and even laughter (Panksepp, 2007), 
and that these play behaviors are crucial for helping animals learn social skills and social 
behavior (Panksepp, 2011).  
Joseph LeDoux (2012) also proposes a model based on an understanding of 
animal behavior and neurocircuitry. Though his model also emphasizes circuits that 
promote survival, his conception differs from Panksepp’s model. LeDoux notes that 
different evolutionary pressures may have led species to develop different behavioral 
reactions in response to activation of a particular survival circuit. That is, while the 
neural circuit responsible for survival behavior is conserved, the behavioral expression 
may not be. This contention differs from Panksepp’s definition of survival circuits, 
which links strongly to fixed behavioral response sets (Panksepp, 2005). Furthermore, 
instead of contending that particular networks instantiate emotional processes per se, 
LeDoux argues that the neural circuitry responsible for survival behaviors such as 
defense, energy maintenance, fluid maintenance, thermoregulation, and reproduction 
(and potentially others) are important starting points for understanding more abstract 
constructs such as emotion and feelings, though they do not encode such complex 
responses themselves. He notes that circuits mediating these behaviors are present in 
animals across many species and may form the basis of higher-level affective cognition 
in humans. According to LeDoux, the human experience of emotions relating to survival 
circuits occurs when an individual becomes consciously aware that a survival circuit has 
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become activated in response to some opportunity or threat and appraises and labels her 
subjective response. LeDoux notes also that other “feelings” such as those related to 
social and cultural learning (e.g., guilt and pride) and those related to sensory functions 
(e.g., a bothersome itch) can occur in the absence of survival circuit activation.  
Whether considering the model proposed by Panksepp, LeDoux, or other animal 
researchers, examining behaviors and responses analogous to human emotional 
behaviors in animals is undeniably important. Such research allows emotion-related 
functions to be characterized in detail at the neurochemical, cellular, and 
neuroanatomical level; however, there are vast organizational and functional differences 
between human and other mammalian brains. Thus, it has been argued that relying 
entirely on animal data to guide conceptions of human emotion is fundamentally 
limited. Furthermore, critics of Panksepp’s model note that his proposed core affective 
circuits correspond to behaviors, not feeling states. Mapping the neural circuits 
responsible for freezing behavior may produce an understanding of an adaptive action 
tendency in response to potentially threatening stimuli, but whether this behavior can be 
thought of as showing a deterministic relationship with the subjective emotional 
experience of fear is not clear (Barrett et al., 2007). To understand the subjective 
experience of human emotion, therefore, one must take recourse to studying humans. 
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1.3 Extending Beyond Emotion: Application of the 
Constructionist Model to Reward and Social Processing 
Taking categorical, constructionist, and animal models of emotion together, these 
theories have all helped clarify the problem of defining and studying emotion. However, 
of the available models, constructionist theories offer the most flexible framework for 
understanding affective processes beyond emotion. If emotion is constructed out of basic 
psychological and neural ingredients as constructionist theories contend, related 
processes such as reward processing and social functioning can also be understood 
through the lens of a constructionist model. At present comparatively few studies have 
attempted to build conceptual bridges between emotion, reward processing, and social 
functioning—subareas that have much in common but nonetheless are typically studied 
in isolation. 
Regions of the brain (e.g., the ventral striatum, the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex) typically implicated in processing stimuli that activate motivational drives and 
have positive hedonic value (i.e., rewards) show up in studies of social (e.g., Bartels & 
Zeki, 2004; Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernández, 2009) and emotional 
responses (Britton et al., 2006) as well. Yet despite evidence pointing to shared neural 
mechanisms between reward, emotion, and social functioning, a recent semantic 
analysis of the frequency with which terms were jointly employed in cognitive 
neuroscience publications indicated that there was little overlap between commonly 
employed terms in neuroeconomics and other subfields (Beam, Applebaum, Jordynn, 
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Moody, & Huettel, in press). This discrepancy might be due in part to differing 
language, conceptual frameworks, and methodological practices. For example, while 
social and emotion neuroscience studies in humans frequently focus on evoked 
subjective responses (e.g., conscious emotion regulation, feelings of social rejection, 
assessments of the self-relatedness of particular words), neuroeconomic investigations 
often focus on the mathematic computations occurring in response stimuli (e.g., 
assessments of the probabilities and magnitudes of outcomes associated with decision 
variables, reward-prediction errors, delay discounting parameters). This, as well as other 
differences in the theory and practices of subfields, might prevent ideas from one field 
from flowing into the others. 
Irrespective of the exact cause, the lack of common dialogue between subfields 
does not serve any single area whereas a shared language and framework could 
improve understanding of each. The constructionist theory of emotion offers a model 
that could serve as common ground for investigations in neuroeconomics and social and 
affective neuroscience. Indeed, Barrett has noted that the elements of her constructionist 
model can be found in other psychological processes (Barrett, 2009). The subjective 
responses to stimuli typically classified as emotional, rewarding, or social all engage the 
major components of the constructionist model posited by Lindquist, Barrett, and 
colleagues. That is, emotional, reward, and social responses all rely on largely 
overlapping networks for core affect and conceptualization. This is because the 
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computational processes described in neuroeonomics do map to subjective experiences. 
While the anticipation of a rewarding stimulus evoked by a visual cue is informed by 
prior experience with the magnitude and volatility of outcomes associated with that cue, 
the anticipation of reward is undeniably associated with a subjectively constructed 
affective state. Moreover, understanding and building predictive mathematical models 
about conditions that evoke subjective emotional responses (e.g., feelings of rejection 
and anger in response to unfair treatment in an economic game) does not detract from 
the authenticity of those feelings and instead could lead to a more precise model for 
behavior. 
1.4 Neural Mechanisms of Domain-General Affective Processing 
Just as emotions cannot be neatly pared down into a few simplistic responses, 
neither can the neural bases of affect be traced to processing in a small set of brain areas. 
Though one of the early pursuits of the field of cognitive neuroscience was to map brain 
regions to psychological functions, the field has undoubtedly moved beyond simplistic 
conceptions of how the brain as a whole or even singular brain regions function. With an 
increase in the prevalence of techniques such as independent components analysis, 
dynamic causal modeling, psychophysiological interaction analysis, and pattern 
classification, there has been a shift towards understanding how interactions within and 
between brain areas and subareas produce specific psychological phenomena. As a 
result, I will not attempt to review the vast literature on all of the brain areas and 
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networks potentially important to the construction of affective responses. Instead, I will 
provide a brief summary of the affective functions of regions of the brain relevant to 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation. (For a more complete discussion of regions 
involved in the construction of affect, see Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 
2012). 
1.4.1 Neural Mechanisms of Domain-General Core Affect 
Amygdala. The amygdala is a subcortical structure located in the medial temporal 
lobe that is made up of several interconnected nuclei (Sah, Faber, Lopez De Armentia, & 
Power, 2003). At the time of this writing, a Google Scholar search including the terms 
“amygdala” and “emotion” produces over 76,000 results (as compared to 35,800 results 
for “insula” and “emotion” and 12,500 results for “ventromedial prefrontal cortex” and 
“emotion”). Thus, there has been considerable focus on amygdalar response to 
emotional stimuli. Discourse on what role the amygdala plays in emotional processing, 
however, has evolved over time. Historically, the amygdala was implicated specifically 
in fear processing. In the late 1930s Heirich Kluver and Paul Bucy demonstrated that 
rhesus macaques that underwent temporal lobectomies demonstrated a condition they 
deemed “psychic blindness.” These animals indiscriminately approached objects, other 
animals and humans without hesitation, and began exploring new stimuli orally. These 
behavioral changes occurred despite no apparent deficits in visual processing. The 
authors concluded that damage to the temporal lobe seemed to interrupt animals’ fear 
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and anger responses (Kluver & Bucy, 1939). Later, it was discovered that these deficits 
occurred specifically as a consequence of damage to the amygdala (Horel, Keating, & 
Misantone, 1975). Since this early work, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the 
amygdala is critically involved in aspects of fear learning including both the acquisition 
and extinction of fear conditioning (Phelps, Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004). 
Moreover, human patients with bilateral amygdala lesions show specific deficits in their 
ability to recognize fearful facial expressions (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 
1994), and fMRI studies have shown that the amygdala is more engaged by fearful faces 
(Breiter et al., 1996) and fear-evocative stimuli such as snakes and spiders (Ohman, 2005) 
than by neutral stimuli. These findings strongly suggest that the amygdala is critical for 
fear processing, but they do not rule out a more general function for this region. The 
amygdala is also activated by a broader range of emotional stimuli including angry, sad, 
and disgusted facial expressions (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006) 
and both negatively and positively valenced scenes (Kim & Hamann, 2007; Winecoff, 
LaBar, Madden, Cabeza, & Huettel, 2011). Furthermore, the deficits in fear recognition 
observed in human patients with bilateral amygdala damage seem to disappear when 
patients are instructed specifically to focus on the eye region of the face (Adolphs, 
Gosselin, Buchanan, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005). Thus, the amygdala’s response doesn’t 
seem to be specific to fear processing per se, but rather in identifying salient stimuli in 
the environment. 
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Evidence that the amygdala is also involved in reward processing likewise 
suggests that this region contributes to domain-general core affective responses. 
Electrophysiological data in rats indicate that a substantial portion of cells in the 
basolateral (26%) and central nucleus (28%) responded similarly to conditioned stimuli 
predicting either a shock or the administration of sucrose (Shabel & Janak, 2009). 
Furthermore, neonatal lesions of the amygdala in rhesus macaques reduce affective 
reactions to both positive as well as negative videos (Bliss-Moreau, Bauman, & Amaral, 
2011). Neuroimaging studies in humans have similarly pointed to a role for the 
amygdala in reward responses. For example, amygdala activation is associated with the 
anticipation of pleasant taste stimuli (O’Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002) 
and monetary rewards (Hommer et al., 2003).  
In addition to both emotion and reward processing, the amygdala also appears 
to encode core affect in response to social stimuli. In Caucasian participants who score 
high on measures of implicit race bias, images of African American faces elicit greater 
activation in the amgydala than images of Caucasian faces (Phelps et al., 2000). 
Moreover, activation in the amgydala is increased when participants view images of 
extreme out-groups (e.g., homeless people and drug addicts) (Harris & Fiske, 2006), and 
when participants judge faces as less trustworthy (Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007). In 
contrast to studies pointing to a role for the amygdala in social aversion, amygdala 
activation has also been observed when participants view erotic stimuli (Ferretti et al., 
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2005; Hamann, 2005). Thus, in social contexts, the amygdala may be important for 
identifying social agents with whom interactions might have evolutionary 
consequences. Given the complexity of human interactions in large societies, a neural 
substrate that enables the tracking of social agents and their meaning is critical for 
reproduction and survival. This conclusion is supported by evidence that in both 
humans (Bickart, Wright, Dautoff, Dickerson, & Barrett, 2011) and primates (Sallet et al., 
2011), amygdalar volume is correlated with social network size. 
Determining the exact mechanism by which the amygdala contributes to core 
affect is by no means straightforward. Though a number of neuroimaging studies 
suggest that the amygdala encodes emotional arousal or emotional salience (Phan et al., 
2003, 2004; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013), the amygdala most likely 
serves a more nuanced role (Adolphs, 2010). It has been suggested that the amygdala 
identifies motivationally-relevant information in the external environment, signaling to 
other brain regions that ongoing processing is necessary to resolve any uncertainty 
pertaining to a particular stimulus to better predict the meaning of that stimulus in 
context (Adolphs, 2010; Lindquist et al., 2012). This role is relevant whether the stimulus 
is a reward, a social interaction, or otherwise emotionally evocative. Thus, the role of the 
amygdala in core affect can be considered domain-general. 
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Insula. The insular cortex, which is located deep inside the Sylvian fissure, is 
involved in a range of both affective and non-affective functions. Often the insula is 
parsed into anterior and posterior regions, which are separated by the central sulcus, 
though more detailed structures based on primate brains have also been suggested 
(Mesulam & Mufson, 1985). As a whole, the insula is thought to serve an integrative 
role, linking information coming from the viscera with sensory inputs from the external 
world (Kurth, Zilles, Fox, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010); however, in keeping with the 
differential connectivity of sub-regions of the insula, these sub-regions are thought to 
perform different though related functions (Flynn, Benson, & Ardila, 1999).  
An array of studies point to a role of the anterior insula in affective processing. 
The anterior insula is often activated in fMRI studies using disgust-related stimuli 
(Calder et al., 2007; Heining et al., 2006; Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & Keysers, 2008; Wicker et 
al., 2003). Further, stimulation of the anterior insula in rhesus macaques produces facial 
expressions and physiological changes associated with the experience of disgust 
(Caruana, Jezzini, Sbriscia-Fioretti, Rizzolatti, & Gallese, 2011). Yet the role of the 
anterior insula in emotion is not constrained to disgust alone. One positron emission 
tomography (PET) demonstrated increased processing in the insula to sadness, anger, 
happiness and fear (Damasio et al., 2000). Moreover, the anterior division of the insula 
has also been shown to be associated with anxiety (Rauch, Savage, Alpert, Fischman, & 
Jenike, 1997), the anticipation of pain (Ploghaus et al., 1999; Strigo et al., 2013), social 
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rejection (Dewall et al., 2010), empathy (Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009), and 
sexual arousal (Hamann, 2005; Stoleru et al., 1999). Studies in the field of 
neuroeconomics have contributed to the variety of tasks that engage the anterior insula, 
implicating this region in elements of risk processing (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005; 
Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; Paulus, Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003; 
Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006; Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008).  
At first blush the range of functions involving the anterior insula seem 
heterogeneous; however, if the neural bases underlying core affect are shared across 
reward, emotion, and social processing, the diversity of tasks that engage the insula is 
largely intuitive. In the face of uncertain circumstances in the external environment—as 
would be encountered during emotionally aversive situations, moral violations, risky 
decisions, and so forth—the brain must prepare the body to react to a variety of possible 
outcomes. The role of the anterior insula in affect might therefore best be described as 
encoding an awareness of feeling states (Craig, 2009; Craig, 2002). This conscious 
awareness of the self and body has been demonstrated in studies of interoception, body 
movement, and affective processing, but also in cognitive processes such as attention 
and perception (Craig 2009). How the anterior insula performs these functions likely 
depends on further anatomical distinction, namely between the dorsal and ventral 
aspects of the anterior insula. A recent analysis of reverse inference maps drawn from 
the online meta-analytic tool Neurosynth indicated that the ventral anterior insula was 
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associated with socioemotional terms such as “emotion”, “face,” and “anxiety,” while 
the dorsal anterior insula was associated with cognitive terms such as “inhibition” and 
“conflict” (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013). Thus, the ventral anterior insula may 
take advantage of fluctuations in bodily states to encode core affective feelings (Wager & 
Barrett, 2004) while the dorsal anterior insula may take advantage of representations of 
body states to guide the actions and the pursuit of goals (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; 
Wager & Barrett, 2004).  
In contrast to the anterior insula, the posterior insula is thought to be involved 
primarily in somatic sensation and sensorimotor processing (Craig, 2002; Wager & 
Barrett, 2004), but this does not preclude a role for the posterior insula in core affect. 
Electrical stimulation of aspects of the posterior insula triggers pain sensation in human 
patients (Ostrowsky et al., 2002), which dovetails with findings that activation in the 
posterior insula increases in response to painful heat stimulation (Brooks, Nurmikko, 
Bimson, Singh, & Roberts, 2002). Based on the response profile of the posterior insula in 
pain processing, it has been suggested that this region may trigger affective reactions 
that guide subsequent motor action in response to painful or otherwise noxious stimuli 
(Frot, Magnin, Mauguière, & Garcia-Larrea, 2007). Thus, the posterior insula may 
provide sensory and motor representations that inform affective responses in the 
anterior insula and ultimately guide affectively motivated behavior. Thus, the anterior 
and posterior insula contribute to core affect by representing changes in the 
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somatosensory and affective state of the body across emotion, reward, and social 
processing. 
 
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex/Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex. The ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are located along 
the most medial aspects of the ventral surface of the prefrontal cortex. Early research on 
human patients with lesions in the vmPFC seemed to suggest that the critical function of 
this region was in mediating interpersonal behavior (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985); however, subsequent animal and 
human work on decision-making and reward processing have indicated that the vmPFC 
instead is involved in reward valuation. Thus, while data from neuroeconomic studies 
do not invalidate the idea that the vmPFC is important for personality and social 
behavior, the functions performed by this region appeared to have more to do with the 
computation of domain-general hedonic value arising in interpersonal situations. 
Data supporting the hedonic value hypothesis of vmPFC function come from 
neuronal recording and lesion studies that have utilized food and liquids as reinforcers 
as well as from studies that have utilized monetary and social rewards as 
reinforcements. Research has indicated that neurons in OFC play a role in how an 
animal develops predictions about upcoming rewards (Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 
1998). In one investigation utilizing single cell recordings in OFC neurons, rats were 
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trained to associate olfactory cues with liquid reinforcements or punishments. Cells fired 
differentially depending on whether the anticipated outcome was a reward or a 
punishment, suggesting that these neurons track the expected value of the upcoming 
stimulus (Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gallagher, 1998). As with studies in the animal 
literature, many neuroimaging experiments have utilized reinforcement learning tasks 
to characterize the neural mechanisms of outcome processing. In a classical conditioning 
paradigm, human participants learned to associate visual cues with the delivery of 
unpleasant, neutral, or pleasant tastes. Paralleling electrophysiological data in animals, 
the OFC tracked increasing value of anticipated outcomes. Specifically, the OFC 
displayed greater activation in response to pleasant than to unpleasant tastes, and 
greater activation in response to pleasant than to neutral tastes (O’Doherty, Deichmann, 
Critchley, & Dolan, 2002).  
The role of the vmPFC in processing hedonic value, however, is not constrained 
to primary reinforcers. Both neuroimaging (Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 
2001; Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, 
Hornak, & Andrews, 2001) and lesion studies (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1997; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994) 
indicate that the vmPFC is important for processing monetary rewards. Furthermore, 
the vmPFC is also engaged when participants view attractive images of faces (Aharon et 
al., 2001; Cloutier, Heatherton, Whalen, & Kelley, 2008; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Smith et 
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al., 2010) and experience positive emotions (Cunningham, Johnsen, & Waggoner, 2011; 
Goel & Dolan, 2001; Lane, Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1997; Vrtička, Sander, 
& Vuilleumier, 2011). One potential unifying explanation for the plethora of pleasant 
stimuli that engage the vmPFC is that the vmPFC encodes subjective value across 
domains, creating a common neural currency for hedonic value. Two studies (Levy & 
Glimcher, 2011; Smith et al., 2010) indicated that activation in the vmPFC seemed to 
encode the “exchange rate” between rewards from different modalities (e.g., food versus 
money versus social rewards), which supports the idea that the vmPFC is the final site in 
which value is represented. 
Evidence from studies of reward processing and decision making have 
demonstrated that the ventromedial prefrontal and medial OFC play an integral role in 
the computation of value signals, and further, that the value signals in this region are 
scaled so that disparate rewards can be encoded and compared. While this notion has 
served as a catalyst for many seminal neuroeconomic studies, it has had limited impact 
on related fields such as affective neuroscience. Yet findings from studies of emotion 
and positive affect broadly construed suggest that the vmPFC does not simply compute 
value signals for stimuli that have obvious motivational relevance. Rather, this neural 
system is involved in the valuation of affectively-relevant stimuli in general. This 
conception of vmPFC/OFC function fits with the hypothesized role of this region in a 
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constructionist model of emotion, namely that it is critical for hedonic value 
computations in core affect (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012).  
1.4.2 Neural Mechanisms of Domain-General Conceptualization 
Dorsolateral and Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex. In addition to commonalities in the 
brain regions responsible for encoding domain-general core affect, there is also ample 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that overlapping neural mechanisms are responsible 
for conceptualization across emotion, social, and reward domains. That is, the 
mechanisms by which prior learning, current goals, attention, and language are 
integrated to situate the experience of core affect in context are domain general. 
Automatically deployed biases in attention, heuristic processing, and implicit memory 
can influence affective feeling states and behavior in response to these feelings, and 
these processes and their neural mechanisms are important elements of 
conceptualization; however, affective responses can also be heavily altered by conscious 
attempts to regulate feelings. When individuals engage in reappraisal, which is one 
strategy for consciously altering affective responses, activations are observed in many 
aspects of the brain including the medial frontal gyrus, the superior parietal lobule, and 
the middle temporal gyrus. Yet neural activation during reappraisal is most consistently 
seen in the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 
2012). 
 29 
In one investigation, we demonstrated that the dlPFC and vlPFC are engaged by 
reappraisal of emotionally positive and negative stimuli (Winecoff et al., 2011). In our 
study, 20 older adults (mean age=69 years) and 22 younger adults (mean age = 23 years) 
underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they were shown 
positive, negative, and neutral photographs. On each trial, participants were instructed 
to either experience their emotions naturally or attempt to regulate their emotional 
responses by employing a detachment reappraisal strategy. Results indicated that across 
subjects, whereas experiencing emotions activated the amygdala, reappraisal activated 
the dorsal and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex as well as the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex and the inferior parietal lobule (Figure 1). Consistent with the hypothesis that 
aspects of lateral prefrontal cortex down-regulate responses in regions implicated in 
emotional arousal, psychophysiological interaction analysis indicated that regulation-
related decreases in activation in the amygdala were associated with increases in 
activation in the left ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1: Neural correlates of cognitive reappraisal and emotional experience. 
(A) The contrast of Reappraise > Experience, collapsed over conditions and age groups, 
revealed that activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (dmPFC), ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
increased when participants engaged in reappraisal. (B) Conversely, the contrast of 
Experience > Reappraise revealed that activation in the amygdala (AMY) was increased 
during emotional experience.  
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Figure 2: A psychophysiological interaction (PPI) between amygdala and 
lateral prefrontal cortex. Using the left and right amygdala as seed regions, we found 
significant PPI effects in the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.  
 
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex have 
been implicated in other aspects of cognitive control such as working memory and 
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response inhibition. Moreover, the process of reappraisal also taps these functions—
keeping the current regulation goal in mind while actively implementing reappraisal, 
inhibiting bottom-up emotional arousal. Thus, it makes intuitive sense that there is 
considerable overlap between the regions thought to perform these cognitive functions 
and those engaged by cognitive reappraisal (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner, Silvers, & 
Buhle, 2012). While the role of the dorsal and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in 
regulating emotions has been well-established (Buhle et al., 2013), there are also a 
growing number of studies documenting the role of these regions in regulating 
responses to rewards. The use of modified reappraisal strategies during the anticipation 
of reward has been associated with decreases in activation in the ventral striatum. 
Moreover, the regulation of reward expectancy has been shown to recruit the 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Delgado, Gillis, & Phelps, 2008; 
Staudinger, Erk, Abler, & Walter, 2009; Staudinger, Erk, & Walter, 2011) as well as the 
inferior parietal lobule/temporoparietal junction (Staudinger et al., 2009, 2011). In 
addition to neural changes, behavioral changes in reward processing also occur in 
response to emotion regulation. For example, emotion regulation alters risk-seeking 
behavior (Heilman, Crisan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010; Martin & Delgado, 2011). 
Beyond emotion and reward-evoked responses in non-social situations, the 
ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices also seem to regulate affectively-
motivated behavior in social contexts. Retaliatory behavior in responses to unfair 
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treatment in the ultimatum game is associated with activation in the insula (Sanfey, 
Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008); 
however, when a participant chooses to accept an unfair offer, the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex shows an increase in activation (Tabibnia et al., 2008). This activation 
may be an implicit indication of emotion regulatory processes operating to suppress the 
desire to retaliate in favor of making a more financially beneficial choice. Van’t Wout 
and colleagues supported this conclusion by examining the effect of explicitly deployed 
cognitive reappraisal on behavior in the ultimatum game (Grecucci, Giorgetta, van’t 
Wout, Bonini, & Sanfey, 2012; van’t Wout, Chang, & Sanfey, 2010). When asked to 
reappraise emotional responses to ultimatum game offers, participants were more likely 
to accept unfair proposals. Furthermore, this shift in behavior during regulation was 
associated with increased activation in the ventolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Grecucci et al., 2012).  Notably, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is also activated 
when individuals make emotionally difficult but utilitarian moral judgments, (Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004), suggesting that this region may act to inhibit 
affective responses that might otherwise interfere with decisions to optimize the greater 
good. Collectively, results across fields suggest that affective reactions induced by 
rewards or social situations can be altered by emotion regulation in much the same way 
as emotional reactions. Further, the dorsal and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices seem to 
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be important for down-regulating responses in regions of the brain involved in core 
affect, irrespective of domain.  
1.5 Summary 
The constructionist model of emotion offers a useful framework for exploring 
affect broadly construed. I hypothesize that the representation of core affect as well as 
conceptualization relies on common neural processes across emotional, reward, and 
social domains. Basic science approaches offer one avenue to explore this hypothesis. To 
test the idea that core affective processes are shared, participants undergoing 
neuroimaging could be asked to make valence and arousal ratings of stimuli across 
domains (e.g., social images, emotional images, and monetary rewards). If responses in 
particular regions scaled with arousal and valence ratings across domains, a domain-
general affect theory would be supported. In Chapter 2, I will describe a variant of such 
a study, which examined the representation of emotional valence in the vmPFC, a region 
of the brain that has been implicated in translating reward value across reward 
modalities. Taking a similar approach, other studies could be performed to examine 
common neural mechanisms for conceptualization. For example, if subjects were asked 
to use cognitive strategies such as selective attention or reappraisal to control responses 
to different domains of stimuli, and these processes seemed to engage neural circuitry in 
a similar fashion, this would support the idea that the mechanisms of conceptualization 
are likewise shared.  
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In addition to basic science investigations, studies of clinical populations could 
also provide support for a domain-general model of affect. Specifically, if the neural 
mechanisms for processing core affect and conceptualization are shared across reward, 
emotion, and social functioning, psychiatric disorders characterized diagnostically by 
disruptions in one domain should also be associated with similar disruptions in the 
others. Anorexia nervosa (AN) is one psychiatric disorder displaying such a pattern of 
psychopathology. In Chapter 3, I will review evidence that AN is characterized by 
common affective disruptions that manifest in emotional, reward, and social functions. I 
will also discuss evidence that the neural mechanisms responsible for representing core 
affect show altered functioning across reward, social, and emotional tasks. In Chapter 4, 
I will present a study showing that eating disorder symptoms are associated with 
altered core affective processing. In Chapter 5, I will expand further on these ideas by 
presenting a study examining the potential mediating role of affective biases between 
eating disorder symptoms and interpersonal deficits. Lastly, in Chapter 6, I will 
summarize and offer some potential extensions of these results.  
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2. Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Encodes Emotional 
Value1 
A domain-general model for affect predicts that the neural mechanisms 
responsible for encoding core affect across reward, emotional, and social processing will 
be largely overlapping. Furthermore, in this model, how the computations involved in 
core affect are performed in the brain should likewise be similar across domains. One 
test of this theory is to investigate the degree to which neural regions known to encode 
aspects of core affect in one domain (e.g., reward) also encode core affect in another 
domain (e.g., emotion). Here, we show that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
which has been strongly implicated in encoding the subjective value of rewards, also 
encodes the subjective hedonic value of emotional stimuli. 
2.1 Introduction 
Characterizing how the brain evaluates rewarding stimuli has been one of the 
central goals of the field of neuroeconomics. Single-unit recording studies in animals 
(Monosov & Hikosaka, 2012; Wallis, 2011) and functional neuroimaging studies in 
humans (Smith & Huettel, 2010) support the idea that reward-related computations 
occur in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and that activity in this region 
does not reflect objective properties of rewards (but see Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2008), 
but rather subjective value (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Several investigations have 
                                                     
1 This chapter is drawn primarily from a coauthored publication published in the Journal of Neuroscience 
(Winecoff et al., 2013). 
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suggested that the vmPFC encodes the subjective exchange rate between different 
reward modalities (e.g., food versus social rewards) (Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & 
O’Doherty, 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Rangel & Hare, 2010). 
It thereby creates a “common neural currency” for reward (Montague & Berns, 2002), 
allowing disparate rewards to be compared. This signal also facilitates judgments of 
value to be extended beyond canonical rewards. For example, the vmPFC has been 
shown to respond to emotional stimuli that generate positive affect (Cunningham et al., 
2011; Goel & Dolan, 2001; Vrtička et al., 2011), which suggests a domain-general role for 
the vmPFC in signaling the presence of motivationally-attractive stimuli (Schoenbaum, 
Roesch, Stalnaker, & Takahashi, 2009). 
Though evidence from decision neuroscience strongly suggests that the vmPFC 
encodes subjective hedonic value, this view is seemingly inconsistent with results 
arising from studies of the neural mechanisms of emotion regulation. A recent meta-
analysis indicated that across several studies using cognitive reappraisal, fear extinction, 
or placebo manipulations, regulating negative emotions led to converging activation 
within a subregion of the vmPFC (Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011). Thus, one 
plausible interpretation of the function of the vmPFC is that it implements cognitive 
control over emotional reactions. Because this meta-analysis only included 
investigations on the regulation of negative affect, an alternative explanation remains: 
the increased signal in the vmPFC reflects the change in emotional hedonic value 
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following emotion regulation. Consistent with a domain-general account of affective 
processing, fMRI data have indicated that when participants regulate affective responses 
to monetary rewards, aspects of the prefrontal cortex similar to those activated by the 
regulation of negative emotion are engaged (Delgado et al., 2008; Staudinger et al., 2009, 
2011); however, only a handful of studies have examined the neural mechanisms of 
positive emotion regulation (Heller et al., 2009; Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bongers, 
& Wessa, 2011; Winecoff et al., 2011). Investigating the encoding of hedonic value in the 
vmPFC during the experience and regulation of positive as well as negative emotional 
stimuli would reconcile disparate research conclusions from neuroeconomics and 
affective neuroscience about vmPFC function. To understand whether the vmPFC plays 
a regulatory (i.e., conceptualizating) or a hedonic value (i.e., core affective) role during 
emotion experience and regulation, we scanned two groups of participants while they 
utilized cognitive reappraisal to regulate their emotional responses to positive and 
negative emotional images.  
2.2 Materials and Methods 
We analyzed data from two experimental samples collected with similar 
experimental tasks and imaging parameters. Our experimental sample (Exp1) was 
newly collected for this study, and we validated our results in a replication sample 
(Exp2) drawn from a previously published study (Winecoff et al., 2011). Experimental 
parameters were nearly identical between the two experiments. Where differences are 
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present, we indicate the parameters for Exp1 in the main text and then list the 
parameters for Exp2 in brackets following.  
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants in Exp1 were 31 younger adults between the ages of 19 and 40 
(M=25; 10 males). Participants reported no history of psychiatric or neurological 
problems or contraindications to fMRI scanning. Exp2 was made up of 20 older adults 
between the ages of 59 and 73 (M=69; 10 males) and 22 younger adults between the ages 
of 19 and 33 years (M=23; 11 males). In addition to meeting all the exclusion criteria for 
Exp1, all participants in Exp2 also scored at 27 or higher on the Folstein Mini-Mental 
State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). The vast majority of fMRI 
studies have constrained their samples to healthy younger adults. Interpretation of these 
results therefore cannot necessarily be extended to a more general demographic. 
Including both younger and older adults in the Exp2 dataset ensures that the results 
hold not only for a typical fMRI sample, but are valid for inferences on a broader 
population in which there is more variance. 
In both experiments, participants were paid $20/hour for time in the scanner and 
$10/hour for time outside the scanner. Each participant provided written consent for a 
protocol approved by the Institutional Review Board of Duke University Medical 
Center. 
 40 
2.2.2 Emotion Regulation Paradigm 
While undergoing scanning, participants completed a cognitive reappraisal task. 
Prior to beginning the fMRI task, participants were extensively trained to perform 
emotion regulation using a cognitive reappraisal strategy. For the Regulation condition, 
participants were instructed to imagine themselves as an objective observer to the 
situation depicted or to imagine the event as having no personal relevance to them. 
These instructions are consistent with prior research using a “self-focused” or 
“detachment” reappraisal strategy (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Kalisch et al., 
2005; Ochsner et al., 2004; Shiota & Levenson, 2009). For the Experience condition, 
participants were instructed to experience their emotions naturally. During training, 
participants verbally reported their responses on both regulate and experience trials to 
the experimenter to signal that they understood the task. After this training, but before 
undergoing scanning, each participant completed practice trials with the same timing as 
the fMRI task.  
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Figure 3: Reappraisal Task. (A) During Experience trials, participants viewed 
the image then saw a cue to experience their emotional reaction to the image naturally. 
Participants were asked to continue to experience their emotions even after the image 
disappeared. After each trial, participants rated the valence of the image. (B) During 
Regulate trials, participants were asked to emotionally detach themselves from the 
image. 
 
In the fMRI task (Figure 3), participants were presented with images from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and 
were asked to either regulate their emotions using cognitive reappraisal (Regulate 
Condition) or to experience their emotions naturally (Experience Condition). Pictures 
were categorized as positive, negative, or neutral based on the normative IAPS ratings 
(valence: positive M=6.8; negative M=2.4; neutral M=5 [Exp2: 7.3, 2.5, 5.1]. Positive and 
negative images were roughly matched for arousal (positive M=5.8; negative M= 5.8 [5.6, 
5.4]), and each condition had equal numbers of images with and without people.  
At the beginning of each trial, a picture appeared on screen for two seconds. A 
cue (“Experience” or “Detach”) [Exp2: “Experience” or “Decrease”] would then appear 
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below the image for two seconds to indicate which strategy to use. The picture would 
then disappear and be replaced by a fixation cross, and the cue would remain on screen 
for an additional 8s [Exp2: 6s]. At the end of each trial, participants were asked to rate 
how positive or negative they felt after having implemented the strategy. Inter-trial 
intervals were a minimum of 4s (range: 4-13s) and were exponentially distributed [Exp2: 
0-8s in 2s intervals]. Participants viewed 125 total images evenly distributed across the 
five trial types (25 Positive-Experience, 25 Negative-Experience, 25 Positive-Reappraise, 
25 Negative-Reappraise, 25 Neutral-Experience) over the course of five runs [Exp2: 150 
total trials, 30 trials per trial type, 6 runs]. Image presentation was pseudo-randomized 
such that within each run participants saw equal numbers of pictures in each of the five 
trial types, but the order of presentation was randomized within each run. Whether each 
image was assigned to the reappraisal or experience condition was counterbalanced 
across participants. Stimuli were presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox 3 in 
MATLAB (Brainard, 1997). 
2.2.3 fMRI Acquisition & Preprocessing 
We acquired functional data on a General Electric 3T scanner with a gradient-
echo inverse-spiral pulse sequence using standard scanning parameters (repetition time 
(TR)=2000 ms; echo time (TE)=30 ms; field of view (FOV)=256 mm; flip angle=60°; 30 
axial slices parallel to the AC–PC plane; voxel size= 4 x 4 x 4mm; [Exp2: 4T scanner, 
TE=31ms; flip angle=90°, 34 slices, voxel size=3.75 x 3.75 x 3.8mm). Each run contained 
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288 [Exp2: 238] volumes of data (first six volumes discarded). A high-resolution 
inversion-recovery prepared SPGR anatomical image was used for normalization and 
co-registration of the functional data (TR=7.48ms; TE=2.98ms; whole brain coverage with 
1 x 1 x 1mm voxels; [Exp2: TR=12.3; TE=5.5ms]).  
FMRI data were analyzed using FSL 4.1.8 FEAT Version 5.98 (Smith et al., 2004). 
Preprocessing included motion correction using MCFLIRT, brain extraction, spatial 
smoothing using an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 6mm (FWHM), and high-pass filtering 
(> 100s). Functional images were normalized using transforms estimated from each 
participant’s own high-resolution anatomical image and FSL’s Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) template using FLIRT (6 degrees of freedom for registration to 
participant’s main structural image, 12 degrees of freedom for registration to standard 
space). All reported results survived full whole-brain correction (individual voxel 
threshold z>2.3; cluster-corrected significance threshold: p<0.05).  All coordinates are 
reported in MNI space, and brain figures were created using MRIcron (Rorden, Karnath, 
& Bonilha, 2007). 
2.2.4 fMRI and Behavioral Analysis 
We utilized FSL’s general linear model (GLM) to assess the influence of our 
behavioral manipulation on brain activation. First-level models corrected for local 
autocorrelation (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001) and assessed brain responses to 
all trials within an explanatory variable within a single run. At the second level we used 
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a fixed-effects model to combine the data across all runs within a single participant. At 
the third level we used a mixed-effects analysis (FLAME 1) to model effects across all 
participants (Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2003; Woolrich, Behrens, Beckmann, 
Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004). For all imaging data, runs with more than five volumes with 
movement of greater than 1mm in any direction were discarded to ameliorate any 
contributions of head motion (6.5% of data discarded; [Exp2: 14.3%]). For all analyses 
not performed within FSL, we utilized SAS version 9.3. 
In our first analysis (“Effect of Emotion Experience and Regulation”), we 
investigated the basic behavioral and neural effects of emotion experience and 
regulation. For our behavioral analysis, we implemented a repeated measures multi-
level model in which we modeled valence and condition as fixed effects and participant 
as a random effect. We utilized a restricted maximum likelihood estimation method and 
a variance components covariance structure. For the fMRI analysis, we modeled valence 
and condition. We created one regressor of interest for each trial type (“Experience-
Positive,” “Experience-Negative,” “Regulate-Positive,” “Regulate-Negative,” and 
“Experience-Neutral”), which modeled the 8s [Exp2: 6s] implementation period. 
Nuisance regressors were included in the model for the initial presentation of the picture 
and for the response period. All regressors were convolved with a standard double-
gamma hemodynamic response function. 
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In our second model of the effects of emotion regulation and experience, we 
sought to characterize participants’ subjective emotional responses. To do so we utilized 
a parametric model including participants’ own trial-by-trial ratings of the valence of 
stimuli. We collapsed across valence (e.g., positive and negative) and examined the 
effect of trial-by-trial ratings within each regulation condition (e.g., Experience vs. 
Regulate). The amplitude of the event-related response was modulated by participants’ 
ratings for each image. The parametric regressor was orthogonalized to the main effect 
to examine activations that specifically scaled with valence ratings. We also included a 
quadratic regressor, constructed by squaring the parametric regressor, to control for the 
effect of any non-linear results. 
We also tested the possibility that neural responses may differ across conditions 
based on the normative IAPS ratings for the stimuli. In this analysis (“Neural Response 
to Normative Valence by Condition”), we used a repeated multi-level model using 
mean-centered IAPS normative ratings and regulation condition as fixed effects and 
participant as a random effect. We then tested whether IAPS ratings, condition, and their 
interaction predicted activation in the vmPFC. An ROI in the posterior vmPFC 
(pvmPFC) was defined based on coordinates (x=6, y=26, z=-14) drawn from a previous 
study of the subjective exchange rate between monetary rewards and attractive faces 
(Smith et al., 2010). Using the methods for single trial analysis described by Mumford 
and colleagues (2012), a first-level model was created for each trial for each participant 
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using the 8s implementation period [Exp2: 6s]. In each first-level model, nuisance 
regressors were included to model all other trials, the initial picture presentation, and 
the response phase. FSL’s motion outliers function was used to identify bad timepoints. 
Trials corresponding to these timepoints were excluded from this analysis. Signal was 
then extracted from the pvmPFC ROI.  
In our final analysis (“pvmPFC Activation is Associated with Differences in 
Behavioral Ratings”), we examined whether activation in the pvmPFC would predict 
trial-by-trial valence ratings even after accounting for IAPS normative ratings, 
regulation condition, and the interaction of ratings and condition. We constructed a 
GLM including experiment number, IAPS normative ratings, condition, and the trial-by-
trial pvmPFC betas used in the previous analysis as independent variables and trial-by-
trial valence ratings as the dependent variable.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Effects of Emotion Experience and Regulation 
We first tested whether participants’ ratings differed as a function of valence 
(Positive vs. Negative) and condition (Regulate vs. Experience). In both experiments, 
there was a main effect of valence (Exp1:F(2,2981)=2217.36; p < 0.0001 & Exp2: F(2, 
4995)=3266.72; p <0.0001). In Exp2 there was an effect of condition (F(1,4995)=9.83; 
p=0.0017), and in both experiments there was a valence by condition interaction (Exp1: 
F(1,116)=27.05; p <0.0001 & Exp2: F(1,160)=4.496; p =0.04), such that regulation led to 
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more positive ratings (i.e., more neutral) for negative stimuli, but less positive (i.e., more 
neutral) ratings for positive stimuli (Exp 1: Positive-Experience, M=6.328, SE=0.057; 
Positive-Reappraise, M=5.068, SE:0.035; Neutral-Experience M=5.044, SE=0.046; 
Negative-Reappraise M=3.360, SE=0.0375; Negative-Experience M=2.211, SE=0.0375. Exp 
2: Positive-Experience, M=6.232, SE=0.042; Positive-Reappraise, M=5.151, 0.042; Neutral-
Experience M=5.145, SE=0.046; Negative-Reappraise M=3.331, SE=0.042; Negative-
Experience M=2.464, SE=0.044).  
We then tested whether ratings differed between valenced stimuli (Positive vs. 
Negative) that had been regulated and neutral images that had been experienced. In 
both experiments there was a significant overall effect of valence category (Exp1: 
F(2,87)=5.71;  p=0.005 & Exp2: F(2,120)=43.21;  p <0.0001). Follow-up tests indicated that 
regulated-negative versus regulated-positive stimuli were rated significantly different 
from each other (two-sided paired t-tests: Exp1: t(30)=54.47; p <0.0001; Exp2: t(41)=22.88; 
p <0.0001) and that both regulated-positive as well as regulated-negative stimuli were 
rated differently from neutral stimuli (Exp1: neg: t(41)=-20.42 p <0.0001; pos: t(41)=5.65;  p 
< 0.0001; Exp2: neg: t(41)=-71; p <0.0001; pos: t(41)=4.71; p <0.0001). These results indicate 
that, for both positive and negative stimuli, regulation was successful in changing the 
subjective experience of hedonic value but did not completely neutralize emotional 
responses (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Valence ratings by task condition. In both Exp 1 and Exp 2, stimuli in 
the Regulate (Reg) condition were rated as less emotionally evocative than images in the 
Experience (Exp) condition. Error bars represent standard error of the mean within 
subjects. 
 
In our imaging data, negative regulation (Negative-Regulate > Negative-
Experience) activated regions of the prefrontal cortex including the inferior frontal 
gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus, and the superior frontal gyrus (see Table 1 for activation 
coordinates). In addition, regulating negative emotion led to increased activation in the 
posterior cingulate cortex and the angular gyrus. In contrast, negative experience 
(Negative-Experience > Negative-Regulate) revealed no significant overlapping 
activations between the two experiments.  
Positive regulation (Positive-Regulate > Positive-Experience) was associated with 
increased activation in regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortex including the middle 
frontal gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the angular gyrus. Conversely, positive 
emotion experience (Positive Experience > Positive-Regulate) was associated with 
activation in the bilateral amygdala and the vmPFC in both experiments. Thus, emotion 
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regulation reduces vmPFC activation compared to that observed during emotion 
experience (Figure 5a; vmPFC peak activations within overlap, Exp1: max Z=4.88, x=4, 
y=22, z=-4; Exp2: max Z=4.61, x=-4, y=44, z=-6).  
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Table 1: Cluster peaks for emotional experience or regulation. x, y, z = 
coordinates of peak voxel, shown in MNI space. Max Z = z-statistic of peak voxel. 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 
Anatomical 
Label 
 
x, y, z  
 
Max Z 
 
Anatomical 
Label 
 
x, y, z 
 
Max Z 
Positive Experience > Positive Regulate 
subcallosal 
gyrus 
4,22,-2 5.24 frontal pole 
frontal pole 
paracingulate 
paracingulate 
occipital pole 
lingual gyrus 
postcentral 
gyrus 
SMA 
postcentral 
gyrus 
cingulate 
parietal 
operculum 
-8,56,2 
-6,62,6 
-8,52,10 
-4,42,-6 
24,-98,8 
-4,-88,-10 
-46,-22,28 
 
-8,-8,46, 
-44,-26,34 
 
-4,-2,36 
-48,-28,24 
5.35 
5.11 
5.21 
4.81 
4.81 
3.97 
5.09 
 
4.83 
4.58 
 
4.33 
4.15 
Increasingly Positive Valence 
medial frontal 
gyrus 
subcallosal 
gyrus 
subcallosal 
gyrus 
precuneus 
precuneus 
precuneus 
-6,34,-16 
 
-2,20,-16 
 
-6,28,-14 
 
-2,-62,20 
-8,-54,6 
-16,-50,4 
4.69 
 
4.47 
 
4.39 
 
4.16 
4.01 
3.78 
paracingulate 
paracingulate 
frontal pole 
precuneus 
precuneus 
precuneus 
posterior 
cingulate 
lingual gyrus 
supracalcarine 
cortex 
2,42,-8 
4,46,-6 
-6,70,6 
0,-66,22 
22,-54,6 
10,-62,18 
14,-48,4 
 
18,-50,0 
-18,-64,12 
4.79 
4.71 
4.2 
3.58 
4.1 
3.23 
3.59 
 
3.55 
3.4 
Positive Regulate > Positive Experience 
frontal pole 
frontal pole 
inferior 
frontal gyrus 
angular gyrus 
34,58,-8 
-44,50,-10 
-52,28,-4 
 
52,-48,38 
4.25 
4.51 
3.59 
 
4.8 
precuneus 
angular gyrus 
angular gyrus 
angular gyrus 
lateral occipital 
0,-74,42 
60,-52,34 
64,-48,24 
48,-52,32 
50,-62,42 
5.02 
5.66 
4.14 
5.85 
4.78 
 51 
angular gyrus 
angular gyrus 
lateral 
occipital 
cortex 
angular gyrus 
angular gyrus 
lateral 
occipital 
cortex 
frontal pole 
lingual gyrus 
middle frontal 
gyrus 
middle frontal 
gyrus 
middle frontal 
gyrus 
48,-48,34 
62,-54,32 
48,-60,52 
 
 
-50,-60,30 
-48,-52,44 
-42,-64,46 
 
 
6,42,54 
46,24,36 
-42,18,34 
 
-38,20,40 
 
-36,12,52 
4.57 
4.45 
4.39 
 
 
4.27 
4.93 
5.32 
 
 
4.09 
5.49 
4.5 
 
4.19 
 
4.04 
cortex 
inferior frontal 
gyrus 
lateral occipital 
cortex 
middle 
temporal 
gyrus 
middle frontal 
gyrus 
middle frontal 
gyrus 
middle frontal 
gyrus 
superior 
frontal gyrus 
 
 
-38,24,20 
 
-38,-62,38 
 
 
-62,-44,-4 
 
 
42,22,36 
 
-46,14,44 
 
-44,16,30 
 
0,24,50 
 
 
5.41 
 
5.9 
 
 
4.42 
 
 
5.71 
 
5.59 
 
5.32 
 
5.7 
Negative Experience > Negative Regulate 
none   occipital pole 
parietal 
operculum 
hippocampus 
postcentral 
gyrus 
28,-100,8 
48,-22,26 
 
-20,-2,-12 
-64,-20,20 
4.15 
4.3 
 
4.34 
4.32 
Negative Regulate > Negative Experience 
superior 
frontal gyrus 
lateral 
occipital 
cortex 
posterior 
cingulate 
angular gyrus 
middle 
temporal 
gyrus 
-2,26,50 
 
-48,-68,48 
 
 
-2,-26,24 
 
44,-56,30 
-62,-38,-
10 
5.29 
 
4.89 
 
 
5.29 
 
5.72 
4.88 
inferior frontal 
gyrus 
lateral occipital 
cortex 
insular cortex 
middle frontal 
cortex 
-54,20,2 
 
-40,-66,42 
 
 
40,20,-4 
36,22,38 
5.45 
 
4.45 
 
 
3.91 
4.07 
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To assess the relationship between vmPFC activation and subjective experiences 
of positive emotion, we also interrogated the effects of participants’ own trial-by-trial 
ratings of stimuli. This model tested the possibility that, like reward, emotional value is 
encoded in the vmPFC as a continuous, graded signal. For stimuli in the Experience 
condition, activation in the vmPFC increased with increasing ratings of positivity 
(Figure 5b). In the same model for regulated stimuli, however, there were no significant 
activations. One potential explanation for this result is that post-regulation, stimuli in 
both the positive and negative regulation condition clustered around neutral valence 
ratings. Thus, if the vmPFC does track final hedonic value, we would not expect its 
activation to vary in conditions in which the subjective experience of emotion is 
essentially constant. Alternatively, it is possible that the encoding of emotional value 
during emotion regulation shifts to another area of the brain. Given the reduced 
variability in ratings in the regulation condition, it is not possible to distinguish between 
these two explanations.  
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Figure 5: Neural mechanisms of positive emotion. (A) The contrast of Positive-
Experience > Positive-Regulate for both Exp1 and Exp2 revealed an overlapping 
activation in the vmPFC. (B) A parametric model using participants’ trial-by-trial 
valence ratings showed that increasingly positive valence ratings were associated with 
increased activation in the vmPFC in the Experience condition. 
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2.3.2 Neural Response to Normative Valence by Condition 
We next tested whether normative IAPS ratings as well as condition would 
predict trial-by-trial estimates of activation in the pvmPFC. Given that the IAPS picture 
set has been rated by thousands of participants (Lang et al., 2008)—and that normative 
ratings for each stimulus were highly predictive of our participants’ ratings of each 
stimulus (Experience Condition: r=0.785; Regulate Condition: r=0.707)—we took 
normative valence ratings to represent a typical response to these stimuli. We then 
tested whether those normative ratings had differential effects upon activation in 
pvmPFC, contingent upon the regulation condition. There was a marginally significant 
main effect of IAPS normative rating (F(1,7982)=3.64, p=0.057) and a main effect of 
condition (F(1,7982)=19.89, p<0.0001). These main effects were qualified by an IAPS 
normative rating by condition interaction (F(1,7982)=6.8, p=0.0091). Follow up tests 
indicated that the effect of IAPS rating was significant in the experience condition 
(t(72)=3.2, p=0.0014, b=0.011) but not in the regulation condition (t(72)=-0.49, p=0.622, b=-
0.0017) (Figure 6). These data indicate that pvmPFC activation tracts typical hedonic 
value during the basic experience of emotion, but not during emotion regulation.  
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Figure 6: pvmPFC activation by normative IAPS Rating. (Left) Overlap between 
the vmPFC ROI from analysis 5b and pvmPFC ROI used to extract parameter estimates. 
(Right) Interaction plot for IAPS normative rating and condition on pvmPFC. Error bars 
reflect standard errors of the model predicted pvmPFC estimates. Within the Experience 
condition, IAPS normative rating predicted pvmPFC activation; however, there was no 
association with IAPS normative rating and pvmPFC activation during emotion 
regulation. 
 
2.3.3 pvmPFC Activation and Differences in Behavioral Ratings 
As a strong test for the role of pvmPFC in subjective emotional value, we next 
investigated whether pvmPFC activation predicted participants’ trial-by-trial subjective 
ratings of each image. A GLM including experiment number, IAPS normative ratings, 
condition, the interaction of IAPS normative ratings and condition, and trial-by-trial 
estimates of pvmPFC activation significantly predicted behavioral ratings (full model: 
F(5,8052)=2,370.75, p<0.0001). The model revealed a main effect of normative IAPS rating 
(F(1,8052)=13449.78, p<0.0001, b=0.37) and a main effect of condition (F(1,8052)=190.44, 
p<0.0001, b=0.026); however, the main effects of normative IAPS ratings and condition 
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were qualified by a significant interaction (F(1,8052)=1841.71, p<0.0001, b=0.433). 
Additionally, there was a main effect of pvmPFC activation (F(1,8052)=4.0, p=0.046, 
b=0.051). These data indicate that even after accounting for the strong behavioral effects 
of our manipulation, pvmPFC activation still predicts the subjective experience of 
emotional value (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Effect of reappraisal, IAPS rating and pvmPFC activation on behavior. 
A general linear model revealed that IAPS normative rating, condition, and an IAPS 
normative rating by condition interaction predicted valence ratings. In addition, there 
was also a significant relationship between pvmPFC activation and behavior. [* denotes 
significance at p<0.05] 
Variable Parameter Estimate (SE) 
Intercept 
Experiment 
IAPS Rating 
Condition 
IAPS*Condition 
pvmPFC 
4.18 (0.047)* 
0.04 (0.026) 
0.37 (0.008)* 
0.31 (0.026)* 
0.43 (0.012)* 
0.05 (0.026)* 
Overall Model 
R2=0.06* 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The vast majority of studies on the neural mechanisms of emotion regulation 
have focused on emotional reactions to negative stimuli. Though positive affect is 
beneficial for mental and physical health (Richman et al., 2005; Tugade, Fredrickson, & 
Barrett, 2004), not all of the consequences of positive affect are adaptive. When 
purchasing a new home, for example, the positive emotion induced by visualizing a 
 57 
blooming garden in springtime could interfere with the negotiation of a better price. 
Unregulated positive affect increases distractibility in tasks that require cognitive control 
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), inflates evaluations of the probability of winning in 
monetary gambling tasks (Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996), and increases the 
likelihood of impulsive purchasing decisions (Weinberg & Gottwald, 1982). In each case, 
a failure to regulate positive affect interferes with the attainment of goals.  
Using stimuli falling along a continuous scale of emotional valence from positive 
to negative—and replication between two experiments—we show that a region within 
vmPFC tracks the subjective value of emotional stimuli. We also examined which sorts 
of affective processes are encoded by the vmPFC: normative stimulus valence (Lebreton, 
Jorge, Michel, Thirion, & Pessiglione, 2009), the engagement of goal-directed regulatory 
processes (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009), and/or trial-to-trial variation in subjective 
hedonic value across stimuli (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Smith et 
al., 2010). Using an independently defined region of interest, we show that trial-to-trial 
variation in pvmPFC predicts the emotional hedonic value of affective images during 
the experience of emotion. These analyses converge on one common conclusion: In the 
context of emotion regulation, the vmPFC encodes stimulus-specific subjective hedonic 
value. 
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2.4.1 vmPFC: Common Economic and Emotional Value 
Studies of reward processing have implicated the vmPFC in the valuation of 
rewards from various modalities: juice (Kim, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2006), faces (Lin, 
Adolphs, & Rangel, 2011; Smith et al., 2010), and non-monetary goods such as snack 
foods and CDs (Chib et al., 2009). This has led to the hypothesis that the vmPFC encodes 
a standardized value signal (Montague & Berns, 2002; Rangel & Hare, 2010). Though the 
common currency hypothesis rarely guides investigations of emotional processing, it 
can nonetheless account for vmPFC function in such studies. The vmPFC is engaged by 
a range of positive stimuli not typically characterized as rewards, including pleasant 
imagined stimuli (Cunningham et al., 2011) and happy memories (Lane et al., 1997). 
These studies support the idea that vmPFC computes a domain-general hedonic value 
signal (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012), manifest in our own data as emotional reward 
value. That is, positive emotion (like reward) is encoded along a continuous scale rather 
than as a binary signal of valence. 
2.4.2 vmPFC: Cognitive Control or Domain-General Subjective Value? 
Several lines of research have implicated the vmPFC as central to executing 
cognitive control. Studies of fear conditioning link vmPFC to the extinction of fear 
(Hartley & Phelps, 2010). Similarly, the reappraisal of negative emotion leads to 
activation in the vmPFC (Delgado, Nearing, Ledoux, & Phelps, 2008; Johnstone, van 
Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Urry et al., 2006). One investigation of 
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reappraisal of positive emotion demonstrated that increasing positive emotion also 
recruits the vmPFC (Kim & Hamann, 2007). These findings suggest that the vmPFC, like 
regions of the dlPFC also activated during emotion regulation (Ochsner & Gross, 2005), 
serves as a locus of affective control. Another interpretation is equally plausible, 
however:  changes in vmPFC activation during regulation could reflect changes in the 
integrated hedonic value of emotional stimuli. Our own analyses are consistent with this 
conclusion.  
Our results predict that while activation in the vmPFC reflects the subjective 
hedonic value of emotional stimuli after regulation has taken place, regions other than 
vmPFC will track the process of regulation itself. In one recent investigation 
(Hutcherson, Plassmann, Gross, & Rangel, 2012), food-deprived participants were 
prompted by a cue to down-regulate, experience, or up-regulate their affective responses 
to images of food items. Participants then indicated how much money they would be 
willing to pay for an opportunity to consume that item. During regulation there was a 
decrease in the association between vmPFC activation and monetary bids and a 
concurrent increase in the association between the dlPFC and monetary bids. Consistent 
with this result, we found greater signal in the dlPFC during the reappraisal of stimuli 
than during the experience of images even when they stimuli matched in subjective 
emotional value. That is, stimuli rated as neutral in the experience condition showed less 
activation in the dlPFC than stimuli rated as neutral in the regulation condition. 
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Furthermore, this relationship held for both positive and negative images. Compared to 
the regulation of positive images, the experience of neutral images activated regions 
previously linked to the emotional content of experienced stimuli.  
Though in our study the dlPFC did not track hedonic value directly, dlPFC 
signal in the regulation condition might reflect computations that are ultimately 
integrated into the final encoding of value. That is, signal in the dlPFC may reflect 
conceptualization processes that are incorporated into subjective affective reactions. 
Participants in our regulation condition were asked to attempt to emotionally detach 
themselves from the images (i.e., to neutralize emotional responses). Though they were 
encouraged to report their emotional responses according to how they actually felt, it 
was clear that the ultimate goal of reappraisal was to alter their emotional experiences. 
Consequently, achieving the goal of regulation might contribute to an integrated neural 
signal for value.  
This interpretation dovetails with findings from a study in which dieters rated 
both the tastiness and healthiness of food items in advance of making decisions about 
whether or not to consume those food items (Hare et al., 2009). Subjects who 
successfully implemented self-control evinced increased activation in the dlPFC (BA 9) 
and decreased activation in the vmPFC when deciding not to consume a tasty but 
unhealthy food – a result interpreted as evidence that the vmPFC integrates goal value 
as well as hedonic value. For both experimental samples in our study, we observed 
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regulation-related activation in the same dlPFC region that interacted with vmPFC in 
the connectivity analysis of Hare and colleagues. Thus, activation in the dlPFC during 
regulation could reflect the parametric contribution of regulation to the ultimate value of 
the stimulus, which is manifest in our data as decreased activation in the vmPFC. 
In summary, our results indicate that the vmPFC does not act as a control region 
during emotion regulation but rather encodes the affective value of emotional stimuli 
along a continuous scale. From the perspective of a domain-general constructionist 
model of affect, the vmPFC encodes hedonic value across reward, emotion, and social 
processing; however, this encoding also reflects conceptualization processes. 
Conceptualization processes such as emotion regulation affect the hedonic value of 
stimuli as they are subjectively experienced. The vmPFC encodes this modified form of 
hedonic value rather than objectively encoding hedonic value irrespective of context. 
Much as emotional processes can be described as “situated in context” (Lindquist & 
Barrett, 2012), the encoding of hedonic value in the vmPFC can be thought of as situated 
within the broader array of psychological processes occurring during the experience of 
affective stimuli.   
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3. Domain-General Affective Disturbances in Anorexia 
Nervosa 
In addition to positing shared neural mechanisms for core affect and 
conceptualization, a domain-general theory of affect makes important predictions about 
the nature of affective disturbances in psychiatric conditions. Many psychological 
disorders are characterized primarily by abnormalities in one particular affective 
domain. For example, it has been hypothesized that drug addiction results from 
pathological reward motivation (Kalivas & Volkow, 2005). In contrast, major depressive 
disorder (MDD) is thought to result from abnormal emotional experience and deficits in 
emotion regulation (Beauregard, Paquette, & Lévesque, 2006). Yet individuals with 
methamphetamine addiction experience profound social problems (Homer et al., 2008), 
and patients with MDD show changes in neural responses to monetary rewards 
(Knutson, Bhanji, Cooney, Atlas, & Gotlib, 2008). A domain-general theory of affect can 
help explain the heterogeneity of affective disturbances in psychiatric disorders and 
could potentially lead to novel insights into how psychiatric disorders develop and can 
be treated. 
One disorder that could be better understood through the domain-general model 
of affect is anorexia nervosa (AN). Compared to other psychiatric conditions such as 
addiction and depression, the pathophysiology is AN is relatively poorly understood; 
This gap in knowledge is particularly compelling as the consequences of the disorder 
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can be dire. In one investigation, during the first year following a first-time admission to 
a hospital, patients with AN were nearly 20 times more likely to die of unnatural causes 
than the general population. Furthermore, this increased risk of death persisted over 
time, with patients showing an 8-fold increase in risk of death 20 years after their initial 
hospital admission (Papadopoulos, Ekbom, Brandt, & Ekselius, 2009). Compounding the 
risk of mortality in AN, many who develop the disorder relapse (Pike, 1998) or 
experience ongoing subclinical problems (Wagner et al., 2006). Furthermore, treatment 
options, particularly for adults with AN, are limited (Agras et al., 2004). Given the 
severity of AN and the many impediments to full-recovery, it is critical to understand 
the factors that contribute to disordered eating. 
A popular folk-psychological theory is that unreasonable standards of beauty 
promoted on television, in movies, and in magazines are adopted by women and girls, 
and their efforts to attain these standards ultimately cause anorexia. This theory is 
bolstered by evidence that prevalence rates of disordered eating and body image 
disturbances are higher in cultures with access to Western media (Makino, Tsuboi, & 
Dennerstein, 2004). However, while exposure to such images can have a deleterious 
effect on body self-esteem in some individuals (Ferguson, 2013; Roberts & Good, 2010), 
it fails to explain how in an environment saturated with images of unattainable beauty 
and thinness, only a small proportion of the general population ever meets full 
diagnostic criteria for AN. The etiology of AN is complex, and is likely the result of 
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interactions amongst genetic, neurobiological, and cultural factors (Bulik, 2005; Collier & 
Treasure, 2004; Kaye, Wierenga, Bailer, Simmons, & Bischoff-Grethe, 2013; Zucker et al., 
2007). However, as the body of research on AN grows, numerous studies point to 
affective factors in the development and maintenance of disordered eating. 
Conceptualizing AN through the lens of a domain-general theory of affect could help 
elucidate some of the commonalities in abnormal processing and behavior across a 
range of circumstances.   
3.1 Core Affective Disruptions in AN 
In the constructionist model of emotion proposed by Lindquist, Barrett, and 
colleagues (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012), core affect is described as arising from 
fluctuations in the state of the body that are subjectively experienced as sensations 
containing both valence (i.e., hedonic value) and magnitude (i.e., arousal). Though 
findings on reward, emotion, and social processing in AN are varied, the overall corpus 
of literature suggests that a disruption in core affect is one key element of disordered 
eating.  
3.1.1 Disruptions in Hedonic Value Processing 
While more than 30% of U.S. adults are currently obese (Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, 
& Curtin, 2010), individuals with AN are able to resist consuming highly palatable foods 
(i.e., those high in fat and sugar). This feature of the disorder alone is suggestive of 
alterations in hedonic processing. That currently-ill patients with AN report preferring 
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high fat tastes less (Stoner, Fedoroff, Andersen, & Rolls, 1996; Sunday & Halmi, 1990), 
and that patients’ aversion to high fat content does not resolve with treatment (Sunday 
& Halmi, 1990) suggests that people who develop anorexia have a fundamentally 
diminished response to hedonic stimuli. Regardless of whether these changes are hard-
wired or occur because patients form negative associations between energy dense foods 
and weight gain, reward-related behaviors in AN are nonetheless transformed. Meta-
analytic data examining self-report studies indicate that patients with AN demonstrate 
lower scores on the novelty seeking subscale of the Temperament and Character 
Inventory (Harrison, O’Brien, Lopez, & Treasure, 2010). Similarly, patients with 
restricting-type AN report reduced fun-seeking tendencies on the Behavioral 
Activation/Behavioral Inhibition System questionnaire (Claes, Nederkoorn, 
Vandereycken, Guerrieri, & Vertommen, 2006). Moreover, women with AN report 
higher levels of social anhedonia (Tchanturia et al., 2012) and show lower levels of 
sexual drive (Castellini et al., 2012; Pinheiro et al., 2010). Beyond self-report data, one 
laboratory experiment indicated that patients with AN show less temporal discounting 
than healthy controls (Steinglass et al., 2012), and another demonstrated that weight-
restored patients were less willing to sacrifice money to view social images (Watson, 
Werling, Zucker, & Platt, 2010).  
Results across gustatory, monetary, and social domains imply that women with 
AN have reduced responsiveness to reward. Thus, one might infer that changes in 
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reward behavior in individuals with AN are driven by a hyposensitive reward system in 
the brain. Much of the neuroscientific data, however, seems to imply the opposite: that 
in patients with AN, the neural circuitry responsible reward processing is actually 
hypersensitive. The neurotransmitter dopamine has a well-characterized role in reward 
processing and motivation (Schultz, 2000). As a result, this neurotransmitter system has 
been the major focus of numerous studies of AN. In women recovered from anorexia, 
homovanillic acid (HVA), which is a dopamine metabolite, is less concentrated in the 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) than in control women (Kaye, Frank, & McConaha, 1999). 
Moreover, positron emission tomography (PET) research has shown that recovered 
participants demonstrate increased D2/D3 receptor binding in the ventral striatum 
(Frank et al., 2005), a region known to be involved in reward valuation (Knutson, 
Delgados, & Phillips, 2008). Because D2/D3 receptors perform different roles in different 
subregions of the ventral striatum (Besson et al., 2010), the interpretation of this finding 
in isolation is complex; however, looking across studies on dopamine processing in AN, 
it has been hypothesized that AN is associated with an increase in the density of D2/D3 
receptors, a reduction in extracellular dopamine levels, or both (Kaye, Fudge, & Paulus, 
2009).  
Parkinson’s patients with pathological gambling problems demonstrate lower 
D2/D3 binding both at baseline as well as during a gambling task (Steeves et al., 2009). 
Similarly, D2/D3 receptor availability in regular methamphetamine users is reduced in 
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the striatum, and reduced striatal D2/D3 receptor availability in these subjects is 
associated with increased impulsivity (Lee et al., 2009). Thus, whereas decreased 
binding of striatal dopamine receptors in addictive behaviors may relate to behavioral 
disinhibition and reward seekingness, increased D2/D3 binding in AN may result in the 
opposite—behavioral inhibition and reduced reward motivation. Supporting this 
conclusion, one recent fMRI study indicated that compared to healthy controls, women 
with AN showed greater response in the ventral striatum to unexpected pleasant tastes 
(i.e., larger prediction error). In contrast, compared to healthy controls, obese women 
showed reduced signal in the ventral striatum (Frank et al., 2012). These data suggest 
that reward hyposensitivity might drive over-consumption and food approach whereas 
reward hypersensitivity might drive under-consumption and food avoidance. 
Though studies of reward function in AN are strongly suggestive of neurocircuit 
abnormalities, they do not necessarily account for how neural processing changes might 
drive food avoidance. One recent study, however, provides a potential explanation. 
Bailer and colleagues (2012) had recovered patients and healthy control women undergo 
PET scanning after receiving amphetamine administration. After a short delay, 
participants were then asked to rate aspects of their subjective emotional states. Though 
in control women D2/D3 binding potential in the ventral striatum was associated with 
an increase in happiness following drug administration, women with a history of AN 
showed no such effect. In contrast, women with AN s
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anxiety following drug administration, and this anxiety response was associated with an 
increase in D2/D3 binding potential in the dorsal caudate. This result fits with other data 
indicating that binding potential in the dorsal striatum in recovered women is positively 
associated with the personality trait of harm avoidance (Frank et al., 2005). Therefore, 
while activation of the reward system may be experienced as subjectively pleasurable in 
normal individuals, it may be subjectively aversive in women with AN, which could 
perpetuate an avoidance of stimuli that activate reward circuitry in the brain (e.g., food 
and social interaction).   
Taken together, studies of reward processing in AN are suggestive of 
disturbances in how stimuli are assigned subjective hedonic value. Based on much of the 
available data on reward processing in AN, it is difficult to determine whether 
disturbances in reward processing occur in response to disruptions in neurobiological 
systems responsible for processing rewards, whether they occur in response to patients’ 
desire to control motivational drives, or both. Though most studies document anhedonia 
in AN, some data indicate women with AN place positive value on exercise-related 
stimuli (Giel et al., 2013). This result, combined with the absence of differences between 
explicit preference ratings for low calorie foods (Stoner et al., 1996), might imply that the 
reward system in AN has been tuned to overvalue disorder-relevant goals and 
undervalue primary and social reinforcers. To explore this hypothesis, future studies 
should investigate whether neural reward response is increased when patients view 
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stimuli that are consistent with their weight-loss goals, and whether the class of stimuli 
that activate reward circuitry in AN changes as patients’ weight and cognitive 
processing normalizes following treatment.  
3.1.2 Disruptions in Punishment Processing 
In addition to changes in positive hedonic valuation, it is probable that 
heightened negative hedonic valuation and arousal also play a role in the etiology of 
AN. One of the ways in which heightened negative affectivity is manifested in AN is in 
increased anxiety. Comorbidity studies consistently document high rates of anxiety 
disorders in patients with AN (Hudson, Hiripi, Pope, & Kessler, 2007; Kaye, Bulik, 
Thornton, Barbarich, & Masters, 2004). In one study, nearly two thirds of a sample of 
women with AN had some form of concurrent anxiety disorder, with over 40 percent 
meeting criteria for obsessive compulsive disorder, 20 percent meeting criteria for social 
phobia, 15 percent meeting criteria for specific phobias, and others meeting criteria for 
generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, or 
agoraphobia (Kaye et al., 2004). This study is consistent with other data documenting the 
high levels of comorbidity with other affectively-related Axis I diagnoses in AN, such as 
major depression, specific phobia, and social phobia (Hudson et al., 2007). High levels of 
anxiety, particularly social anxiety, are reported prior to the onset of disordered eating 
(Kaye et al., 2004), and anxiety disorders are often present in first-degree relatives of 
those with AN (Strober, Freeman, Lampert, & Diamond, 2007). These data suggest that 
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increased negative affect is a trait feature of people who develop AN rather that a 
consequence of starvation. Treatment outcomes, therefore, could potentially be 
improved by understanding how negative affect contributes to disordered eating.  
Beyond elevated rates of DSM diagnoses for anxiety disorders, women with AN 
also show increased negative affect in individual difference measures and laboratory 
tasks. For example, on the Temperament and Character Inventory (Cloninger, Svrakic, & 
Wetzel, 1994) women with AN score higher on the harm avoidance subscale (Harrison, 
O’Brien, et al., 2010), indicating that they show a tendency to excessively worry, 
mentally fatigue easily, fear uncertainty, and withdraw socially (Cloninger, Svrakic, & 
Przybeck, 1993). Paralleling these findings, women with AN demonstrate an attentional 
bias towards threatening faces (Harrison, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2010) indicating 
hypervigilance to negative social cues. Similarly, looking across studies, women with 
AN demonstrate an increased Stroop effect for body and weight-related stimuli (Dobson 
& Dozois, 2004), which suggests that these stimuli may be treated by individuals with 
eating disorders in the same way that violent words and threat-related stimuli are 
processed by normal participants. This profile of state-level increases in anxiety and 
heightened sensitivity to potential threat suggests that women who go on to develop 
eating disorders may be prone to over-engage with negative cues in the environment.  
In contrast to the neurotransmitter dopamine, which has been strongly 
implicated in reward learning, it has been hypothesized that serotonin (5-HT) may be 
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critical for learning from punishment (Boureau & Dayan, 2011). Moreover, individual 
differences in the temperament trait of harm avoidance are thought to be mediated 
through the serotonin system (Cloninger, 1987); therefore, serotonergic processing 
differences in AN may be responsible for the increase threat sensitivity. Beyond the 
affective function of serotonin, 5-HT is also involved in appetite regulation (Blundell & 
Halford, 1998). Thus, changes in serotonergic processing could potentially account for 
disturbances in both eating and aversive responses in AN (Kaye et al., 2009). To explore 
such changes, early studies examined CSF concentrations of 5-hydroxyindoleactice acid 
(5-HIAA), which is the major metabolite of 5-HT in the brain. Results indicated that 
when ill, women with AN show decreased accumulation of 5-HIAA in CSF ( Kaye, 
Gwirtsman, George, Jimerson, & Ebert, 1988), but following weight restoration patients 
show no difference (Kaye et al., 1988; Kaye, Gwirtsman, Ebert, & Weiss, 1984) or even 
elevated levels of 5-HIAA (Kaye, Gwirtsman, George, & Ebert, 1991). These results 
suggest that extracellular levels of 5-HT, which are thought to correspond to 5-HIAA 
levels (Stanley, Traskman-Bendz, & Dorvonini-Zis, 1985), may vary depending the stage 
of the disorder and may drive behavioral changes accordingly. More recent 
investigations taking advantage of PET or single-photon emission computerized 
tomography (SPECT) have also found alterations in the 5-HT system in AN. Consistent 
with the hypothesis that currently-ill women with AN have reduced extracellular 
concentrations of 5-HT, one PET study found increased 5-HT1A binding in regions of the 
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prefrontal, cingulate, and orbitofrontal cortex (Bailer, Frank, Henry, Price, Meltzer, 
Mathis, et al., 2007). A similar study investigating the 5-HT transporter found greater 
binding potential in women with AN in the ventral striatum (Bailer, Frank, Henry, Price, 
Meltzer, Becker, et al., 2007). In contrast, studies of 5-HT2A have shown decreased 
binding in the left frontal cortex, bilateral parietal cortex, and bilateral occipital cortex 
during the ill state (Audenaert, Laere, Dumont, & Vervaet, 2003) and in the amygdala, 
hippocampus, and cingulate after recovery (Frank et al., 2002).  
Pointing towards the affective consequences of altered 5-HT in AN, harm 
avoidance has been shown to correlate with binding potential of 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A in 
regions involved in emotional processing (Bailer et al., 2004, 2005; Bailer, Frank, Henry, 
Price, Meltzer, Mathis, et al., 2007). Drawing on such results, Kaye, Fudge & Paulus 
(2009) have hypothesized that individuals who will develop AN have altered 
extracellular serotonin paired with an imbalance between 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A receptor 
density, predisposing these individuals towards negative emotionality. As a 
consequence of social and hormonal changes occurring during puberty, further changes 
to the 5-HT system exacerbate disturbed mood and satiety processing, leading to 
increased dieting. Extreme dieting serves to reduce mood disturbance during the ill-
state by reducing in 5-HIAA and increasing binding of 5-HT1A. As 5-HT activity 
normalizes during weight restoration, however, patients experience dysregulated mood 
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and emotion, perpetuating the cycle of disturbed affect and attempts to control affect 
through disordered eating.  
3.1.3 Disruptions in Bodily and Interoceptive Signal Processing 
The corpus of existing research on reward and punishment sensitivity in AN 
suggest that key experiential elements of core affect are disrupted in AN. Yet, core 
affective properties are thought to originate from fluctuations in bodily sensations 
(Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012). As a result, changes in the 
representation of bodily feedback should also have consequences for core affective 
responses. One of the diagnostic features of anorexia is a disturbance in the experience 
of the body. For example, and women with AN often overestimate the size of their own 
bodies (Skrzypek, Wehmeier, & Remschmidt, 2001) and demonstrate exceptionally poor 
body self-esteem (Cash & Brown, 1987). While these changes may be suggestive of a 
higher-order cognitive disturbance, the disruption in body experience may also occur at 
the level of basic somatic sensation and bottom-up interoceptive responses. Thus, how 
changes in the subjective experience of core affect arise may be dependent on alterations 
in the experiential accuracy, integration, and neural representation of bodily feedback in 
AN. 
Though the majority of studies examining bodily disturbance in AN rely entirely 
on self-report questionnaires (e.g., Adenzato, Todisco, & Ardito, 2012; Simon Baron-
Cohen et al., 2013; Merwin et al., 2013), a handful have probed patients’ responses to 
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objectively quantifiable interoceptive signals or sensory stimulation. Using a task in 
which participants were asked to estimate the length between two tactile stimuli on the 
body, Keizer et al, (2011) demonstrated that currently-ill patients were less accurate at 
tactile perception than controls. Furthermore, the tendency to overestimate the size 
between two tactile stimuli was associated with greater body image disturbance in 
participants with AN. Previous research has demonstrated that tactile perception can be 
altered by manipulating participants’ experience of their body (de Vignemont, Ehrsson, 
& Haggard, 2005; Ehrsson, Kito, Sadato, Passingham, & Naito, 2005; Taylor-Clarke, 
Jacobsen, & Haggard, 2004). Thus, it is unclear whether the difference in tactile 
estimation is due to changes in basic somatosensory perception or disorder-related 
alterations in the body experience.  
To resolve this question, Keitzer and colleagues (2012) performed a follow up 
experiment using a pressure detection task and a two-point discrimination task, both 
tasks thought to measure basic tactile perception. They also used their previously 
employed tactile estimation task, which they hypothesized would be more sensitive to 
contextual manipulation. Group differences were observed in all three tasks. In the 
tactile discrimination task, patients required more distance than controls between the 
two stimulation points distinguish them. Replicating previous findings, patients also 
overestimated the distance between two points in the tactile estimation task. 
Interestingly, while there were no differences between force detection between patients 
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and controls when stimuli were applied to the arm, patients were able to detect stimuli 
at lower levels of force on the abdomen, implying that disturbances in somatic sensation 
may not be due entirely to reduced sensory perception, but may vary depending on how 
much attention a patient pays to a particular body area.    
Paralleling differences in tactile perception, evidence suggests that patients with 
AN have altered interoceptive processing. To explore the nature of interoceptive 
changes in AN, Pollatos and colleagues (2008) had patients and control participants 
perform a heartbeat detection task. In addition to assessing objective interoceptive 
sensitivity, they also assessed subjective interoceptive perception through the 
interoceptive awareness scale portion of the Eating Disorders Inventory. Results 
indicated that patients were less accurate than controls on the heartbeat detection task 
and reported poorer interoceptive awareness. These results imply that patients with AN 
are less sensitive to signals arising from the body. Also pointing towards reduced 
visceral and somatosensory reactivity in AN, several studies have indicated that 
currently-ill patients demonstrate higher pain thresholds  (Bär et al., 2006; Krieg, 
Roscher, Strian, Pirke, & Lautenbacher, 1993). Taken together, these results could 
suggest that individuals who develop AN are less sensitive to bodily sensations, a 
predisposition that might lead to inattention to hunger and fatigue.  
This theory, however, ignores at least one important consideration with respect 
to clinical investigation, namely the problem of differentiating the chicken from the egg. 
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In the general population, only a relatively small proportion of people will develop the 
disorder (Hudson et al., 2007). Consequently, it is extremely difficult to perform 
prospective studies in participants who will develop AN. This creates a challenge in 
determining whether abnormalities that manifest during the acute phase of anorexia are 
a consequence of starvation or a cause. In contrast to the theory that reduced 
interoceptive processing may trigger disordered eating, others have hypothesized that 
increased interoceptive reactivity in combination with other factors may predispose 
certain individuals to developing AN (Kaye et al., 2009; Zucker et al., 2013). This 
hypothesis is supported by evidence that both currently-ill and weight-restored patients 
with AN report elevated sensory sensitivity (Merwin et al., 2013; Zucker et al., 2013). 
The conflict between these results and results suggesting that bodily sensitivity in AN is 
reduced (i.e., Keizer et al., 2011, 2012; Pollatos et al., 2008) may be due in part to changes 
in how core affective signals are treated by individuals with AN. Current and previous 
patients report greater sensory avoidance (Zucker et al., 2013) and emotional avoidance 
(Wildes, Ringham, & Marcus, 2010). Thus, chronically employed efforts to regulate and 
avoid bodily feedback might ultimately result in poorer ability to perceive and interpret 
such signals during the ill-state and possibly after recovery.  
Given that visceral and somatic sensations are integral components of core affect, 
disturbances in bodily sensation perception in AN should be accompanied by changes in 
affective perception. Indeed, studies consistently show that patients with AN have high 
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levels of alexithymia, or difficulty identifying and describing feelings (for a review see 
(Nowakowski, McFarlane, & Cassin, 2013; but see Parling, Mortazavi, & Ghaderi, 2010). 
In addition to showing deficits in understanding their own sensations, feelings, and 
reactions, patients with AN also show a range of social cognitive deficits (Zucker et al., 
2007), in particular in tasks that tap mentalizing and theory of mind skills (Harrison, 
Sullivan, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2009; Oldershaw, Hambrook, Tchanturia, Treasure, & 
Schmidt, 2010; T. A. Russell, Schmidt, Doherty, Young, & Tchanturia, 2009; Tapajóz 
Pereira de Sampaio, Soneira, Aulicino, & Allegri, 2013). If models for how other people 
think and behave are built through simulation, as one prominent hypothesis for theory 
of mind would suggest (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004), it is intuitive that 
individuals with a limited capacity or willingness to process their own bodily and 
affective states would have difficulty understanding other people’s emotions and social 
behavior. This could potentially explain the attachment difficulties patients with eating 
disorders often experience (Ward, Ramsay, Turnbull, Benedettini, & Treasure, 2000) and 
also the elevated levels of autistic traits in individuals with AN (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2013; Hambrook, Tchanturia, Schmidt, Russell, & Treasure, 2008).  
Dovetailing behavioral evidence on interoceptive and sensory dysfunction in 
AN, neuroimaging data support the idea that disturbances in somatic and visceral 
processing in AN are associated with altered reward, social, and affective functioning. A 
number of studies document changes in insular processing in anorexia (Table 3), leading 
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some to conclude that insular dysfunction is responsible for many of the behavioral 
disturbances in AN (Nunn, Frampton, Fuglset, Törzsök-Sonnevend, & Lask, 2011). 
While a few of these studies have found hypoactivation of the insula in AN (e.g., 
Wagner et al., 2007), a majority show increases in activation in the insula to disorder-
relevant stimuli (Friederich et al., 2010; Miyake et al., 2012; Mohr et al., 2010; 
Oberndorfer, Frank, et al., 2013; Strigo et al., 2013). Whether disturbances in insula 
processing are specific to the more affectively-relevant anterior division (Chang et al., 
2013) or the more somatosensory-relevant posterior insula (Chang et al., 2013) is unclear; 
however, an interaction between physical and affective disturbances may be at play. 
Notably, one study (Strigo et al., 2013) showed that while the anticipation of pain led to 
greater increases in anterior insula activation in women recovered from AN, pain 
stimulation led to less activation in the posterior insula in the clinical group. Thus, there 
may be a disconnect between the anticipation of physically or affectively aversive events 
in women with AN and their actual response to such events. The same study found that 
levels of alexithymia correlated with anterior insula activation during pain anticipation. 
Thus, the degree of the mismatch between expected and experienced responses may 
depend on an individual’s ability to accurately perceive and describe sensations. 
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Table 3: Summary of neuroimaging findings on insular processing in AN 
Paper Task Contrast Laterality Division 
 Bär et al., 2013 High pain vs. low pain 
stimulation 
HC > AN L Posterior 
Friederich et al., 
2010 
Thin body images AN > HC R Anterior 
Gizewski et al., 2010 Food vs. non-food 
images when sated 
HC > AN 
 
AN > HC 
R 
 
L 
Posterior 
 
Posterior 
Holsen et al., 2012 High calorie foods vs. 
objects before a meal 
 
High calorie foods vs. 
objects after a meal 
HC > AN 
 
HC > AN 
 
HC > AN 
B 
 
R 
 
L 
Anterior 
 
Anterior 
 
Anterior 
Miyake et al., 2012 Negative social words 
vs. control words 
AN > HC L Posterior 
Mohr et al., 2010 Compare thin body 
distortion to ideal body 
vs. compare thin body 
distortion to actual 
body 
AN > HC R Anterior 
Oberndorfer, 
Simmons, et al., 
2013 
Food vs. object images REC > HC R Anterior 
Oberndorfer, Frank, 
et al., 2013 
Sucrose taste stimuli HC > REC R Anterior 
(extending to 
posterior) 
Redgrave et al., 
2008 
Stroop task for “Thin” 
vs. “XXXX” 
AN > HC L Posterior 
Sachdev, Mondraty, 
Wen, & Gulliford, 
2008 
Images of self vs. 
images of others 
HC > AN L Anterior 
Strigo et al., 2013 Pain anticipation 
 
Pain stimulation 
REC > HC 
 
 
HC > REC 
R 
 
 
R 
Anterior 
 
 
Posterior 
Wagner et al., 2007 Water and sucrose taste 
stimuli 
HC > AN B ROI of entire 
insula 
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3.2 Conceptualization Disruptions in AN 
In addition to disruptions in core affect, women with AN also show changes in 
how sensory and affective information is made meaningful. As construed by the 
constructionist model of emotion, affective responses are situated in context (Lindquist 
& Barrett, 2012). That is, the interpretation of an affective response is contingent upon 
prior associative learning, current goals, and current environment. A number of 
cognitive changes have been documented in AN including cognitive inflexibility 
(Tchanturia et al., 2004), a local versus global processing bias (Southgate, Tchanturia, & 
Treasure, 2008), and weak central coherence (Lopez, Tchanturia, Stahl, & Treasure, 
2009). These cognitive changes no doubt contribute to how emotional and visceral 
stimuli are interpreted; however, changes in how consciously deployed emotion 
regulation is engaged also contributes to disruptions in AN. In contrast to other 
psychiatric disorders such as addiction, bipolar disorder, and depression, patients with 
AN are described as over-controlled expert emotion regulators relentlessly employing 
emotion regulation to attain weight-loss goals (Zucker & Harshaw, 2011). It is 
surprising, therefore, that the number of empirical studies specifically focused on 
emotion regulation in AN is limited (see Haynos & Fruzzetti, 2011 and Safer et al., 2011 
for a discussion). Nonetheless, several experiments have taken advantage of the 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) to assess 
emotion regulatory dysfunction in AN. The DERS is made up of six subscales focusing 
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on non-acceptance of emotional responses, difficulties engaging in goal-directed 
behavior in the face of negative emotion, problems with impulse control when 
experiencing emotions, problems accessing appropriate emotion regulation strategies 
when upset, lack of emotional clarity, and lack of emotional awareness. Differences in 
total DERS score (Harrison et al., 2009; Merwin et al., 2013) and all of the DERS subscales 
(Merwin  et al., 2013) have been found between currently-ill patients and healthy 
controls. Though one study reported no differences between total DERS score between 
recovered patients and healthy controls (Harrison, Tchanturia, et al., 2010), another 
found differences in access to emotion regulation strategies, non-acceptance of 
emotional responses, emotional awareness, and emotional clarity (Merwin et al., 2013). 
Thus, problems with emotion regulation may be a predisposing factor for AN and may 
contribute to on-going disturbances following recovery. 
One question given the limited ability to cope with emotional distress in patients 
with AN is how these individuals attempt to control emotional responses. Bradycardia 
is frequently observed during the ill-state (Halmi, 1974; Mont et al., 2003) as is 
hypothermia (Halmi, 1974), and a reduction in sympathetic nervous system responses to 
social stressors  (Monteleone et al., 2011). These changes in physiological responses seem 
to be related to body weight. For example, self-reported interoceptive awareness and 
body mass index are inversely correlated (Pollatos et al., 2008). Similarly, currently-ill 
patients with lower BMIs report less emotion dysregulation (Brockmeyer et al., 2012); 
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thus, starvation itself may be a maladaptive strategy patients with AN employ to 
regulate hyper-reactive somatic sensations by turning down the gain on physiological 
responding altogether. In recovered patients, less emotion dysregulation is associated 
with less self-reported sensory sensitivity. As a result, recovery may be related to an 
improved ability to deal with uncomfortable bodily and affective sensations and to 
regulate them appropriately (Merwin et al., 2013).  
In addition to employing starvation to control affect, there is evidence that 
women with AN attempt to regulate their emotions through maladaptive cognitive 
strategies. Patients with AN demonstrate blunted facial displays of emotion (Claes et al., 
2012; Davies, Swan, Schmidt, & Tchanturia, 2012) despite stable (Davies et al., 2012) or 
elevated negative emotional experiences (Claes et al., 2012). These data suggest that 
patients with AN may over-engage in expressive suppression. That is, they attempt to 
control overt displays of emotion rather than trying to change the nature of their 
emotional experience through cognitive change (Gross & Thompson, 2007). As an 
emotion regulation strategy, expression suppression is suboptimal for at least two 
reasons. First, habitual use of expressive suppression, as compared to cognitive 
reappraisal, is associated with worse mental and social outcomes (John & Gross, 2004), 
and increased rather than decreased activation in the amygdala and insula (Goldin et al., 
2008). Thus, this strategy likely increase rather than decreases  negative emotionality 
and dysphoric mood typical of patients with AN. Second, emotions serve an important 
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function in signaling in social interactions. Blunted facial expressions of emotion in AN 
may interfere with clinicians’ ability to form a therapeutic alliance with patients and 
could potentially contribute to day-to-day interpersonal difficulties (Zucker et al., 2007) 
and attachment problems associated with AN (Ward et al., 2000). 
3.3 Summary of Affective Disruptions in AN 
Both behavioral and neuroscience data suggests that AN is associated with 
disturbances in core affect as well as conceptualization. Consistent with the idea that 
reward, emotion, and social functioning rely on many common processes and neural 
circuits, these disruptions are not constrained to eating behaviors, but extend into 
emotional and social arenas. To that end, disruptions in core affect in AN result in 
reduced motivation to pursue rewards whether food, monetary, or social in nature and 
drive heightened harm avoidance across domains. Though the exact biological and 
psychological cause of these disruptions is not yet known, there is likely a role for 
altered processing of interoceptive and sensory stimuli in the insula, alterations in 
dopamine processing and reward circuitry, and changes in cognitive control 
implemented by the prefrontal and parietal cortices. Future research should investigate 
the degree to which disturbances in AN are domain general, and whether there are 
disruptions in AN that are specific to particular cognitive or affective processes.  
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4. Social Processing in Anorexia Nervosa is Associated 
with Disruptions in the Neural Mechanisms of Core 
Affect1  
The body of evidence on anorexia nervosa (AN) indicates that patients 
experience disruptions in reward, emotional, and social processing. Taken collectively, 
prior studies suggest that there may be an overall skew in the processing of core affect, 
whereby patients with AN experience affective stimuli as aversive, irrespective of 
stimulus modality. Such a bias may be due to alterations in the experience of the body or 
interoceptive differences, functions that rely on the insular cortex. Here, we demonstrate 
that the neural circuitry involved in core affect (i.e., the insula) and conceptualization 
(i.e., the prefrontal cortex) are different in AN. Further, we show that eating disorder 
symptoms are related to changes in social anxiety. 
4.1 Introduction 
AN is a rare but serious psychiatric disorder that is associated with high rates of 
relapse (Richard, Bauer, & Kordy, 2005), suicidality (Bulik et al., 2008), and mortality 
(Birmingham, Su, Hlynsky, Goldner, & Gao, 2005). Though the primary diagnostic 
features of AN concern disturbances in eating, weight, and body experience (American 
Psychological Association, 2000), consistent with a domain-general theory of affect, 
patients with anorexia also display numerous disruptions in emotional and social 
                                                     
1 This research was presented at the International Conference on Eating Disorders in May of 2013 and is co-
authored by Karli Watson, Katie Gaddis, Lori Keeling, Michael Platt, Scott Huettel, and Nancy Zucker. 
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functioning (Zucker et al., 2007). For example, studies have indicated that women with 
AN show deficits in emotion recognition (Harrison et al., 2009; Oldershaw et al., 2010) 
and emotional empathy (Adenzato et al., 2012). Similarly, elevated levels of autism 
symptoms in AN have been reported in both adolescents (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013) as 
well as adults (Hambrook et al., 2008). In addition to socioemotional disturbances, 
women with AN show increased sensitivity to threat and punishment (Harrison, 
O’Brien, et al., 2010); therefore, one potential explanation for social dysfunction in AN is 
that social stimuli trigger aversive emotional responses, which promote social 
withdrawal and avoidance. This hypothesis is consistent with the elevated rates of social 
anxiety disorders in AN (Godart, Flament, Lecrubier, & Jeammet, 2000; Hinrichsen, 
Wright, Waller, & Meyer, 2003; Kaye et al., 2004) well as biases in visual attention 
towards angry (Harrison, Tchanturia, et al., 2010) and rejecting faces (Cardi, Di Matteo, 
Corfield, & Treasure, 2013). 
Recent research has indicated that behavioral disturbances in AN are 
accompanied by neural changes in areas of the brain associated with affective processing 
(Phillipou, Rossell, & Castle, 2013). Though functional and structural differences have 
been observed in the amygdala (Holsen et al., 2012; Joos et al., 2011; Miyake et al., 2010) 
the cingulate cortex (Amianto et al., 2013; Cowdrey, Park, Harmer, & McCabe, 2011; 
Friederich et al., 2010; Joos et al., 2011) and the orbitofrontal cortex (Amianto et al., 2013; 
Frank et al., 2012; Frank, Shott, Hagman, & Yang, 2013), there has been a strong interest 
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in understanding how differences in insular functioning relate to symptoms in AN 
(Nunn et al., 2011). The insular cortex has been implicated in interoception, or 
representing the state of the body (Craig, 2009; Craig, 2002). Given the many 
interoceptive changes in AN (Pollatos et al., 2008; Zucker et al., 2013), it is 
understandable that patients demonstrate differential insular processing of food-related 
stimuli (e.g., Gizewski et al., 2010; Holsen et al., 2012; Oberndorfer, Frank, et al., 2013; 
Oberndorfer, Simmons, et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2008). Yet, the insula has also been 
strongly implicated in a range of socioemotional processes such as responses to 
disgusting pictures (Britton et al., 2006), to over-priced goods (Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, 
Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007), and to social rejection (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & 
Williams, 2003). Consequently, if the encoding of affect is domain-general, we would 
expect patients with AN to demonstrate changes in insular engagement to food-related 
as well as socially-related stimuli. 
Supporting this theory, one study by Miyake and colleagues (2012) showed that 
when women with AN were shown negative social words such as “betrayal” and 
“anger” they showed greater activation in the left posterior insula than when they 
viewed neutral words such as “movement” and “region.” In another study of social 
processing in AN, patients showed greater activation in the right anterior insula when 
comparing their own body to an idealized thin body distortion (Friederich et al., 2010). 
While both of these studies point to increased insular processing of social stimuli in AN, 
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neither included an affectively neutral social condition as a control. As a result, it is not 
possible to determine whether the observed insular activation was related to the 
negative valence or the social nature of the stimuli. Further complicating the 
interpretation of insular changes in AN, several studies utilizing social stimuli have 
found no differences in insular activation in patients (Cowdrey, Harmer, Park, & 
McCabe, 2012; McAdams & Krawczyk, 2014).  
In the current study, we sought to investigate the neural mechanisms of social 
processing in AN. To rule out the potential effects of starvation on brain response and 
cognition, our clinical population included subjects with a history of restricting-type 
anorexia, but who were currently weight restored. Subjects underwent functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they viewed images of faces of varying 
attractiveness, bodies of varying weights, and scrambled images. In a separate testing 
session, participants rated the weight and attractiveness of each image they viewed in 
the scanner and also completed survey measures of social and emotional cognition. We 
hypothesized that when clinical participants viewed social images, they would show 
increased activation in the insular cortex and other affective regions, and that activation 
in these regions would be associated with increased social anxiety.  
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4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
21 women with a history of anorexia (AN) and 23 healthy control (HC) women 
completed the experiment. Participants were recruited through fliers posted on the 
campuses of local universities and through a database of previous participants. All 
participants were first screened through a brief phone interview. Potential clinical 
participants then completed an online clinical duration interview, which was reviewed 
by a PhD-holding clinical psychologist to determine diagnosis. To be included in the 
sample, clinical participants had to have met DSM-IV criteria for restricting type AN in 
the past but have maintained a healthy weight for at least 6 months. Diagnoses based on 
the online interview data were again confirmed through an in-person structured clinical 
interview with a clinical psychology doctoral student with expertise in eating disorders. 
Participants who reported no history of disordered eating during the telephone 
screening were included in the healthy control sample and were selected to be matched 
to clinical participants on age, race, education, and medication status. Demographic 
characteristics of our sample are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Demographic characteristics by group. 
 HC 
Mean (SD or %) 
AN 
Mean (SD or %) 
 
F 
 
p 
Race 
• Caucasian 
• Asian 
• African American 
• Native American 
 
17 (73.9%) 
3 (13.0%) 
2 (8.7%) 
1 (4.3%) 
 
16 (76.2%) 
4 (19.0%) 
1 (4.8%) 
0 (0.0%) 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
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Age (years) 
Education (years) 
 
 
25.13 (3.43) 
15.72 (1.57) 
 
 
22.48 (3.90) 
15.86 (2.55) 
 
 
6.20 
0.05 
 
 
0.02 
0.83 
 
 
4.2.2 Testing Procedure 
All participants completed the experiment over the course of three or four testing 
days. Participants provided informed consent for a protocol approved by Duke 
University Medical Center’s Institutional Review Board and were paid $30 per hour for 
their time. Prior to testing, participants completed an online battery of survey measures 
of emotional, interpersonal, and social functioning. On the first day of testing, 
participants completed consent and payment forms and were familiarized with the fMRI 
task inside a mock scanner, where they were also trained to minimize head movement. 
On the second day of testing participants underwent fMRI testing. For the last testing 
session, participants had the option of completing all of the remaining tasks over the 
course of one or two separate testing days. The final testing session included a battery of 
cognitive, social, and emotional tasks as well as the structured clinical interview. During 
this session, participants were shown all the images they viewed inside the scanner and 
were asked to rate the attractiveness of face and body images using a 9-point Likert scale 
from least attractive to most attractive. In addition, participants were asked to rate the 
weight of body images using a 9-point scale from extremely underweight to extremely 
overweight. 
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4.2.2.1 Survey Measures 
To index current eating disorder symptoms, participants completed the Eating 
Disorders Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q; Fairburn & Cooper, 1993). The EDE-Q is 
a 41-item survey that indexes both disordered eating behaviors as well as pathological 
cognitions about the body, food, and eating. Moreover, the survey asks about current 
height and weight allowing for the computation of body mass index (BMI). The EDE-Q 
has four subscales: restraint, eating concern, shape concern, and weight concern. A 
global EDE-Q score is calculated by averaging scores across the four subscales. In 
addition to indexing eating disorder symptoms, we also wanted to measure participants’ 
level of social functioning. To do this, we had all participants also complete the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation questionnaire (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), which is composed of 
30 true or false questions used to assess anxiety over negative social evaluation. Previous 
studies have documented that FNE is elevated in women with eating disorders 
(Hinrichsen et al., 2003), and that heightened FNE is associated with increased restrictive 
eating amongst non-clinical women (Gilbert & Meyer, 2005). Thus, we used scores on 
the FNE as an index of social anxiety and as a potential risk factor for ongoing 
disordered eating. 
4.2.2.2 fMRI Stimuli 
In our scanner task, participants were presented with 144 images each of female 
faces, female bodies, and scrambled face images. All images were drawn from publically 
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available Internet sources. Body images included the face and as well as the body from 
at least the waist up. Prior to our current study, a group of healthy female participants 
rated a large set of potential face and body images on weight and attractiveness. Images 
included in our current experimental protocol were selected based on these ratings to 
maximize variance in the weight and attractiveness dimensions. 
4.2.2.3 fMRI Paradigm 
The scanner task consisted of 6 functional runs with 72 trials each. Our task 
implemented a mixed blocked-event related design such that 8 images from each trial 
type (i.e., faces, bodies, scrambled) were presented consecutively. At the start of each 
trial an image from one of the image categories was presented onscreen for 2s. To ensure 
that participants were actively engaged in the task, on 12 trials per run participants were 
given 5s to rate the attractiveness of the image on a scale of one to four using a button 
box (Figure 7). Presentation order was pseudorandomized such that one of 10 timing 
templates designed to maximize model efficiency was selected from a randomized list. 
Inter-trial intervals were drawn from an exponential distribution with a minimum of 2s 
and a maximum of 12s. Images were displayed using Presentation software.  
 
 Figure 7: fMRI Task Paradigm. 
scrambled images for 2s. On most trials, image presentation was followed by a variable 
length inter-trial interval. On a subset of trials, participants were given 5s to rate the 
attractiveness of each image using a button box.
 
4.2.3 fMRI Acquisition & Preprocessing
Magnetic resonance
a spiral-in pulse sequence. We utilized standard imaging parameters (TR=2s, TE=27ms 
FOV= 256mm, flip angle =60°, voxel size=
the AC-PC plane). To allow for the stabilization of the 
each run were discarded. Due to a programming error, runs for the first ten participants 
contained variable numbers of volumes from 250 to 294. Data acquired for the rest of the 
participants contained 278 volumes of functional data per run. High
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Participants viewed images of faces, bodies, and 
 
 
 images were acquired on a General Electric 3T scanner using 
4 x 4 x 4 mm, 20 axial slices collected parallel to 
fMRI signal, the first 5 volumes of 
-resolution 
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inversion-recovery prepared SPGR structural images were collected for each participant 
to aid in anatomical registration and normalization (TR=7.2ms, TE=2.9ms, FOV= 256mm, 
flip angle =12°, voxel size=1 x 1 x 1mm).  
Preprocessing steps included brain extraction using BET, a high pass filter 
(>100s), spatial smoothing using a 6mm full-width half maximum Gaussian kernel, and 
motion correction using MCFLIRT. Motion correction occurred with respect to the 
middle volume of each run. FMRI data were normalized using transforms from each 
participant’s own high resolution anatomical scan (6 degrees of freedom) and a 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) anatomical template (12 degrees of freedom) 
using FLIRT. 
4.2.4 fMRI & Behavioral Analysis 
Behavioral data were analyzed using SAS Version 9.3. Analysis of FNE and EDE-
Q scores was performed using a general linear model including group status as the 
independent variable. All EDE-Q subscale scores were analyzed separately. Weight and 
attractiveness ratings were analyzed using a multi-level model including participant as a 
random effect and group as a fixed effect. A restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
method and a variance components covariance structure were used. All reported 
statistics represent Type-III sums of squares. 
Imaging data were analyzed using a general linear model in FSL version 4.1.8, 
FEAT version 5.98 (Smith et al., 2004). First-level models included regressors for each of 
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our image types (i.e., faces, bodies, scrambled images) and were corrected for local 
autocorrelation within a single run (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001). At the 
second level, a fixed-effects model was used to combine data from all runs within a 
single participant. At the third level, a mixed-effects model was used to combine data 
across participants. For region of interest analyses, mean percent signal change was 
extracted from functional regions of interest using featquery.  
To test for the basic effects of our manipulation, we created one regressor for 
each trial-type for the 2s presentation period as well as a nuisance regressor for the 
response period during trials in which participants made an attractiveness rating. We 
convolved all regressors with a standard double-gamma hemodynamic response 
function. We also tested for the effects of individual difference measures on patterns of 
neural activation by creating two separate models using participants’ global scores on 
the EDE-Q and the FNE as a regressor at the third level. To isolate activation that 
specifically correlated with our individual differences measures, FNE and EDE-Q scores 
were orthogonalized with respect to the mean. All brain figures were produced using 
MRIcron (Rorden et al., 2007). 
Due to a problem with the output files generated during the fMRI task, 
functional imaging data from one participant in the AN group was discarded. Out of the 
behavioral metrics, one control participant did not complete the EDE-Q. A total of 40 
participants completed the FNE (21 AN, 19 HC), 20 clinical participants and 17 control 
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participants completed the attractiveness ratings task, and 17 clinical participants and 18 
control participants completed the weight ratings task.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Behavioral Results 
Significant group differences emerged in the EDE-Q, with clinical participants 
showing elevated eating disorder symptoms in each of the four EDE-Q subscales as well 
as in the global EDE-Q (all ps<0.01). Similarly, though clinical participants were not 
currently underweight, they did show significantly lower BMIs than controls 
((F(1,42)=4.6; p=0.038; Table 5). In addition to elevated eating disorder symptoms, 
analysis of FNE data indicated that participants with a history of AN also reported 
significantly greater fear of negative evaluation than controls (F(1,39)=7.31, p=0.01; Table 
5).  
 
Table 5: Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) and Eating Disorder Examination 
Questionnaire (EDE-Q) scores by group. 
 HC 
Mean (SD) 
AN 
Mean (SD) 
 
F 
 
p 
EDE-Q 
• Current BMI 
• Restraint 
• Eating Concern 
• Weight Concern 
• Shape Concern 
• Global 
 
 
23.14 (7.44) 
0.47 (0.70) 
0.08 (0.16) 
0.34 (0.41) 
0.67 (0.61) 
0.39 (0.41) 
 
20.86 (8.2) 
1.33 (0.98) 
0.72 (0.75) 
0.99 (0.95) 
1.88 (1.51) 
1.24 (0.95) 
 
4.60 
11.06  
15.85 
9.45 
11.87 
14.91 
 
  0.04 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
 
FNE 8.90 (7.44) 15.52 (8.2) 7.31   0.01 
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To explore whether there was an association between eating disorder symptoms 
and social anxiety symptoms, we created a model in which clinical status, FNE score, 
and their interaction were included as independent variables and global EDE-Q was 
included as a dependent variable. Results indicated that FNE significantly predicted 
EDE-Q scores (F(3,36)=4.77; p=0.036) whereas neither group (F(3,36)=0.71; p=0.40) nor the 
group by FNE score interaction (F(3,36)=1.40; p=0.24) was significantly associated with 
global EDE-Q. Thus, social anxiety predicted disordered eating even when accounting 
for clinical status. No group differences emerged in attractiveness or weight ratings 
(Table 6). Thus, despite differences in social anxiety and disordered eating, explicit 
reports of the value of social images were not different for clinical participants. 
 
Table 6: Attractiveness and weight ratings by group. 
 HC 
Mean (SD) 
AN 
Mean (SD) 
 
F 
 
p 
Weight Ratings 
Bodies 4.71 (2.20) 4.84 (2.23) 0.81 0.38 
Attractiveness Ratings 
Faces 
Bodies 
5.08 (1.37) 
4.49 (2.06) 
4.89 (1.42) 
4.66 (2.27) 
0.81 
0.60 
0.37 
0.44 
 
4.3.2 fMRI Results 
In our fMRI analysis, results from the basic contrasts indicated that in response 
to body images, healthy control women showed greater activation in the middle frontal 
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gyrus (Max Z=4.36, x=46, y=20, z=40) while clinical participants showed greater 
activation in the lateral occipital cortex/occipital fusiform gyurs (Max Z=3.42, x=-30, y=-
90, z=-20; Table 7). No group differences emerged for the contrast of face images.  
 
Table 7: Group differences in whole-brain activation to body images. 
Anatomical Label x,y,z Max Z 
HC > AN 
middle frontal gyrus 46, 20, 40 4.36 
AN > HC 
lateral occipital cortex/ 
occipital fusiform gyrus 
-30, -90 ,-20 3.42 
 
Beyond basic group differences, our parametric models revealed several neural 
changes associated with disordered eating and social cognition. The third-level analysis 
of current eating disorder symptoms across participants indicated that higher global 
scores on the EDE-Q were associated with stronger response in the right insula to faces 
(Max Z=3.71, x=40, y=11, z=-5, p<0.001, uncorrected; Table 8, Figure 8). Furthermore, 
participants with lower FNE scores showed increased activation in Heschl’s gyrus and 
in the frontopolar cortex (Table 8, Figure 9).    
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Figure 8: Whole-brain correlation with global Eating Disorder Examination 
Questionnaire (EDE-Q) scores. (A) Higher activation in the insula to face images is 
associated with higher global EDE-Q. (B) Scatter plot of mean % signal change in the 
insula by global EDE-Q by group. 
  
  
Figure 9: Whole brain correlations with Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) 
Scores. (A) Higher activation in the frontal pole to bodies is correlated with 
(B) Scatter plot of mean % signal change in the 
Higher activation in Heschl’s gyrus is correlated with 
mean % signal cha
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frontal pole and FNE by group. (C) 
lower FNE. (D) Scatter plot of 
nge in Heschl’s gyrus and FNE scores by group.
 
 
lower FNE. 
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Table 8: Correlation between brain activation and individual different factors 
Anatomical Label x,y,z Max Z 
Increasing EDE-Q & Face Images 
Insula 40, 11, -5 3.71 
Increasing FNE & Bodies 
Frontal pole 
Heschl’s gyrus 
44, 36, -20 
-48, -26 , 10 
4.07 
4.02 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Though extreme caloric restriction is itself associated with social withdrawal 
(Keys, Brozek, Henschel, Mickelson, & Taylor, 1950), there is evidence suggesting that 
interpersonal difficulties may be a predisposing factor in AN. Premorbid Asperger’s 
syndrome, autism-like traits, and problems with social interaction have been reported 
(Gillberg & Råstam, 1992) as has premorbid social phobia (Kaye et al., 2004). These 
disruptions in social functioning often persist after recovery and contribute to ongoing 
psychological difficulties. At a ten-year follow up, problems with psychosocial 
functioning still affected nearly half of a sample of women with AN (Wentz, Gillberg, 
Gillberg, & Råstam, 2001), and 18% of these patients met diagnostic criteria for some 
variant of autism spectrum disorder at reassessment (Nilsson, Gillberg, Gillberg, & 
Råstam, 1999). Furthermore, the patients in this sample meeting criteria for a disorder 
involving social difficulties (autism spectrum disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
or obsessive-compulsive personality disorder) had particularly bad clinical, sexual, and 
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socioeconomic outcomes (Nilsson, Gillberg, Gillberg, & Råstam, 1999). Collectively, 
these results strongly signal a need to understand the relationship between social 
functioning and psychopathology in AN. 
A domain-general theory of affect predicts that affective functions rely on 
common neural mechanisms. Thus, examining the neural mechanisms associated with 
core affect and conceptualization should lead to insight into the nature of social 
dysfunction in AN. Our results indicated that though participants with a history of AN 
did not differ in explicit ratings of the weight and attractiveness of social images, they 
did show a number of behavioral and neural changes associated with social processing. 
First, we found that our weight-restored participants reported higher levels of eating 
disorder symptoms in each of the EDE-Q subscales, suggesting they still experience 
cognitive and behavioral problems with eating. Consistent with a domain-general 
theory of affect, these participants also experienced greater fear of negative evaluation, 
indicating that ongoing disturbances were not constrained to eating-related behaviors, 
but also influenced socioemotional functioning. 
Results from our fMRI analysis indicated that healthy control women showed 
greater activation in the middle frontal gyrus. This region of the brain has been 
frequently implicated in processes such as working memory (Owen, McMillan, Laird, & 
Bullmore, 2005), response inhibition (Blasi et al., 2006), reasoning (Krawczyk, Michelle 
McClelland, & Donovan, 2011), and emotion regulation (Winecoff et al., 2011). In 
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contrast, while viewing bodies, women with a history of AN showed greater activation 
in the lateral occipital gyrus extending into the lateral fusiform gyrus. These brain 
regions are involved in visual functions such as object processing (Hocking & Price, 
2008) and attention to color (Barrett et al., 2001). Thus, it is possible that when viewing 
bodies, women with AN engage in primarily perceptual processing, which supports 
bottom up core affective responses, whereas healthy women engage more cognitive 
processes to conceptualize the meaning of these images in context.  
In addition to basic group differences, we also found neural associations with 
individual differences in psychopathology. Across all participants, scores on the global 
EDE-Q correlated with activation in a sub-region of the insula during the presentation of 
faces. This aspect of the insula has been associated with painful heat (Farrell, Laird, & 
Egan, 2005) and mechanical stimulation (Maihöfner, Seifert, & Decol, 2011). 
Furthermore, studies informing participants that fear-evocative stimuli such as loud 
noises, shocks, or painful pressure will follow a particular cue (i.e., instructed fear) show 
consistent activation in this brain area (Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010). Yet the role of 
this region is not constrained to somatic sensation alone. Highly empathic individuals 
showed increased activation in this area of the insula when witnessing social exclusion 
(Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011). Thus, the insular region observed in our study 
seems to code for viscerally-evocative stimuli whether physical, emotional, or social. 
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In keeping with this hypothesis, there is evidence to suggest that differential 
insula processing in women with AN is associated with both changes in somatic 
sensation as well as emotional functioning. In a task in which participants anticipated 
and experienced painful heat stimulation, women recovered from AN showed a greater 
activation in an area of the insula just dorsal to our own brain-behavior correlation 
(Strigo et al., 2013). Furthermore, in this study, levels of alexithymia correlated with 
greater insular activation during pain anticipation in recovered anorexics. Thus, in 
individuals with high levels of current eating disorder symptoms, social stimuli may 
engage circuitry involved in the anticipation of threat. If social stimuli are experienced 
as subjectively threatening in these individuals, this response could further perpetuate 
interpersonal problems. Given the relationship between activation in the insula to pain 
anticipation and levels of alexithymia, this bias in associating bodily arousal with threat 
may be due to an inability or willingness to correctly interpret the visceral sensations 
activated by social stimuli. 
In contrast to eating disorder symptoms, participants’ anxiety about negative 
evaluation did not scale with activation in the insula or other regions of the brain 
frequently implicated threat or anxiety responses. FNE scored did, however, correlate 
with activation in the temporal lobe and in the frontopolar cortex. Given the role of the 
frontopolar cortex in self-referential processing (Sajonz et al., 2010), it is plausible that 
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participants with high levels of anxiety about social evaluation lack the ability to draw 
on knowledge about themselves to create accurate self-representations.  
Taken together, our results indicate that even after weight restoration, eating and 
social disturbances in AN persist. Considered from the perspective of a domain-general 
theory of affect, the neural mechanisms of bodily signaling are overactive in individuals 
with AN. Given the bias towards negative affect in patients, these bodily responses may 
be interpreted as aversive, resulting in avoidance and withdrawal, not only from food, 
but also from social situations.  
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5. Disruptions in Core Affect Explain Social Dysfunction 
in Anorexia Nervosa 
Results from previous neuroimaging studies as well as from Chapter 4 suggest 
that the neural mechanisms responsible for core affect are altered in individuals with 
anorexia nervosa (AN), and that these alterations may contribute to social deficits. In 
particular, changes in the insula, which is implicated in representing the affective and 
homeostatic state of the body, may lead to social dysfunction in AN. Given the insula’s 
role in responses to threatening or painful stimuli (Mechias et al., 2010), one possible 
explanation is that individuals with disordered eating experience social stimuli as 
subjectively threatening. Here, we tested the hypothesis that social difficulties in AN are 
a consequence of biases in core affect and demonstrate that sensitivity to harm accounts 
for the association between disordered eating and social problems. 
5.1 Introduction 
Prior literature demonstrates that individuals with AN experience an overall 
increase in negative affect. For example, patients with AN show heightened anxiety 
(Godart, Flament, Lecrubier, & Jeammet, 2000; Kaye et al., 2004), higher levels of anger 
(Krug et al., 2008; Miotto, Pollini, Restaneo, Favaretto, & Preti, 2008), greater disgust 
sensitivity (Aharoni & Hertz, 2012), and high levels of harm avoidance (Fassino et al., 
2002; Klump et al., 2004; Klump et al., 2000). In line with these findings, neuroscientific 
investigations of AN have revealed differential functioning in regions of the brain 
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responsible for processing arousal, emotion, and interoceptive stimuli (Kaye et al., 2009, 
2013; Nunn, Frampton, Fuglset, Törzsök-Sonnevend, & Lask, 2011; Seeger, Braus, Ruf, 
Goldberger, & Schmidt, 2002).  
The domain-general account of affect posits that disruptions to affective 
processing will affect not only bodily and emotional responses, but also social 
functioning. Evidence from animal studies supports this conclusion and has interesting 
implications for AN. In rats, exposure to a single series of foot shocks results in social 
withdrawal that persists for weeks (Mikics et al., 2008). Furthermore, social dysfunction 
itself may maintain affective disturbances. For example, following exposure to a 
socially-defeating interaction, rats show an initial decrease in body weight and an 
increase in anhedonia and defensive behaviors (Razzoli, Carboni, & Arban, 2009). Thus, 
increased threat sensitivity in AN may create a maladaptive cycle whereby patients 
experience their environment as threatening and avoid social interactions. When they do 
engage in interpersonal interactions, these interactions are judged as aversive, thereby 
perpetuating heightened anxiety and further social avoidance.  
An affective profile in which social stimuli are associated with aversive 
responses could potentially explain the marked interpersonal problems individuals with 
AN experience. To examine the relationship between pathological eating, affective 
processing, and social dysfucntion, we had women with a current diagnosis of AN 
(AN), women with a prior diagnosis of AN but who were currently weight restored 
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(WR) and healthy control women (HC) complete survey measures to index their current 
eating disorder symptoms, personality, and social functioning. We hypothesized that 
women with current or previous AN would show heightened harm avoidance and 
reduced novelty seeking as indexed by the Temperament and Character Inventory. 
Moreover, we predicted that variability in these measures would predict poorer social 
functioning, particularly in clinical participants. 
5.2 Materials and Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
The experimental sample was made up of 52 female participants between the 
ages of 18 and 55 (M=27 years; SD=9.2 years). Participants were recruited through fliers 
posted at nearby universities, via online advertisements for websites focused on eating 
disorders, and through notices sent to mailing lists for local healthcare providers who 
specialize in eating disorders. To determine the clinical status of potential participants, 
all participants first completed a brief phone screening. Participants in the final sample 
also completed surveys to index lifetime eating disorder symptoms as well as an in-
person structured clinical diagnostic interview conducted by a PhD-level clinical 
psychologist. To be included in the current AN sample (n=18), participants had to meet 
the criteria for AN as specified by the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Diverging from the DSM-IV criteria, however, in the current study participants were still 
eligible for inclusion in the AN sample if menstruation was present. For inclusion in the 
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WR sample (n=17) participants had to have previously met diagnostic criteria for AN 
but have been weight restored for at least six months. All participants included in the 
HC sample (n=20) had to have no current or previous eating disorder symptoms. 
Demographics characteristics of our sample are presented in Table 9. The majority of our 
sample was Caucasian and our participants were an average of 28 years old with an 
average of roughly an undergraduate education. Our groups did not differ significantly 
on education (F(2,48)=1.75, p=0.219).  
 
Table 9: Demographics by Means (SD) or Frequency (%) 
 AN 
(n=17) 
WR 
(n=17) 
HC 
(n=18)  
Total 
(n=52) 
Age 28 (9.41) 29 (10.49) 28 (10.33) 28 (9.9) 
Years Education 15.06 (2.30) 16.75 (3.34) 15.78 (2.56) 15.84 
(2.78) 
Race/Ethnicity 
• White/Caucasian 
• Black/African 
American 
• Asian 
• Hispanic/Latino 
• Mixed Race 
 
 
18 (100%) 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
 
15 (88.2%) 
1 (5.9%) 
 
1 (5.9%) 
0 (0%)  
0 (0%)  
 
10 (55.6%) 
4 (22.2%) 
 
1 (5.6%) 
2 (11.1%) 
1 (5.6%) 
 
43 (83.0%) 
5 (9.6%) 
 
2 (4.0%) 
2 (4.0%) 
1 (1.9%) 
Relationship Status 
• Married 
• Divorced 
• Separated 
• Engaged 
• Single, Partnered 
• Single, Not 
Partnered 
 
2 (11.8%) 
1 (5.9%) 
1 (5.9%) 
0 (0%) 
3 (17.6%) 
10 (58.8%) 
 
5 (29.4%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
1 (5.9%) 
4 (23.5%) 
7 (41.2%) 
 
4 (22.2%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%)  
0 (0%)  
8 (44.4%) 
6 (33.3%) 
 
11 (21.0%) 
1 (1.9%) 
1 (1.9%) 
1 (1.9%) 
15 (28.9%) 
23 (44.2%) 
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5.2.2 Testing Procedure 
Participants underwent a structured clinical interview and completed a battery 
of questionnaires to index cognitive, social, and emotional functioning as well as current 
and past eating disorder symptoms. Testing sessions were constrained to 3 hours, and 
participants were offered frequent breaks to avoid mental fatigue. For the current study, 
we only report results from the following subset of questionnaires drawn from the full 
experiment: Autism Spectrum Quotient, Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire, 
and the Temperament and Character Inventory. Results from other questionnaires 
administered as a part of this study are reported elsewhere (Merwin et al., 2013; Zucker 
et al., 2013; Zucker et al., 2013).  
5.2.2.1 Survey Measures 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001). The AQ is a 50-item scale used to assess the level of autism-like traits in 
individuals with normal intelligence. Respondents indicate their answers to each item 
using a 4-point Likert scale, with higher scores reflecting more autism-like symptoms. 
Mean AQ scores for women have been reported as 15.4 (SD=5.7) for healthy control 
women and 38.1 (SD=4.4) for women with Asperger syndrome or high functioning 
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Studies using both adults (Hambrook et al., 2008) and 
adolescents (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013) indicate that women with AN show elevated 
scores on the AQ compared to controls (adults with AN, M=23.2; adolescents with AN, 
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M=21.8). Based on Baron-Cohen and colleagues initial validation of the AQ, the original 
instrument was broken into five domains: social skills, attention switching, attention to 
detail, communication, and imagination (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001); however, a factor 
analysis of a large data set suggested that a three-factor structure including social skills 
deficits, details and pattern processing, and communication and mindreading deficits 
may be more appropriate (Austin, 2005). As a result, we utilized the three-factor model 
for our own analyses. 
Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q; Fairburn & Cooper, 1993). The 
EDE-Q is a brief, 41-item questionnaire used to assess current eating disorder symptoms 
both in terms of behavior and cognition. The scale first prompts respondents to report 
events that occurred in the past 28 days to orient them to the time period. For eating 
disordered behaviors, the questionnaire probes for the absence or presence of eating 
disorder symptoms within the previous 28 days and assesses frequency of occurrence 
either in total number of days the symptom was present (e.g., no days, 13-15 days, etc.) 
or number of times the symptoms occurred. For eating disorder cognitions, symptoms 
are assessed for the severity of respondents’ concerns along a 7-point scale. For example, 
in response to “how dissatisfied have you been with your shape?” participants can 
respond from “0-not at all” to “6-markedly.” The EDE-Q is composed of four subscales: 
restraint, eating concern, shape concern, and weight concern. A global EDE-Q score is 
computed by averaging scores across the four subscales. 
 111 
Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI; Cloninger, Svrakic, & Wetzel, 1994). The 
TCI is a 240-item self-report scale used to assess aspects of personality and 
temperament. The TCI is broken into seven subscales, four measuring temperament 
(harm avoidance, novelty seeking, reward dependence, and persistence) and three 
measuring character (self-directedness, self-transcendence, and cooperativeness). Prior 
studies have indicated that as compared to healthy controls, patients with AN are 
typically high in harm avoidance (Fassino et al., 2002; Klump et al., 2000) and persistence 
(Fassino et al., 2002) and low in novelty seeking (Harrison, O’Brien, Lopez, & Treasure, 
2010b; Klump et al., 2000), cooperativeness (Klump et al., 2000), and self-directedness 
(Fassino et al., 2002; Klump et al., 2004; Klump et al., 2000).   
5.2.3 Data Analysis 
All experimental variables were visually inspected, and measures for skewness 
and kurtosis were calculated to ensure a reasonable approximation of the normal 
distribution. For each outcome variable, observations that fell more than three standard 
deviations away from the mean were removed. After the removal of 2 observations 
(both HC) for cooperativeness scores and one observation (HC) for reward dependence 
on the TCI, all outcome variables demonstrated skewness and kurtosis values < |2|. 
Where participants failed to fill out all items of a questionnaire subscale or report 
information on any outcome measure, those participants’ scores were removed from 
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analysis of those measures. Reported statistics represent values after the removal of 
incomplete data and outliers.  
To test for group differences, we used SAS 9.3 to perform an ordinary least 
squares ANOVA including a three-level variable for group (i.e., AN, WR, HC) as our 
allowed-for factor. Where the overall model was significant, four follow-up contrasts 
were performed to indicate where groups differed (AN vs. HC, AN vs. WR, WR vs. HC, 
(AN+WR) vs. HC). Based on prior literature demonstrating differences in novelty 
seeking (Harrison, O’Brien, et al., 2010; Klump et al., 2000) and harm avoidance in AN 
(Fassino et al., 2002; Klump et al., 2004; Klump et al., 2000), we also performed two-step 
hierarchical regressions to explore whether novelty seeking or harm avoidance scores 
significantly improved estimates of participants’ AQ social skills scores above and 
beyond group membership alone. At Step 1, we created a dummy variable for clinical 
status where healthy control participants were assigned a value of “0” and currently ill 
and recovered participants were assigned a value of “1.” At Step 2, the regression 
included both the dummy variable for clinical status as well as scores on the harm 
avoidance and/or novelty seeking subscales of the TCI.  
To examine whether the relationship between current eating disorder symptoms 
and social skills deficits could be explained by differences in either harm avoidance 
(Mediation Model 1) or novelty seeking (Mediation Model 2), we utilized the MBESS 
package developed for R to estimate 95% confidence intervals (Kelley, 2010; Kelley, 
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2007a, 2007b; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). A non-parametric bootstrap analysis with 10,000 
samples was performed, and significance was determined based on whether the 
bootstrapped confidence interval contained 0 (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Group Differences in Disordered Eating, Temperament, and 
Social Functioning 
 By design, there was an effect of group membership on current body mass index 
(BMI) (F(2,47)= 17.01, p<0.0001). Those with current AN differed from both the HC 
population (F(1,47)=32.12, p<0.0001) as well as the WR participants (F(1,47)=15.07, 
p=0.0002). Our weight restored participants and healthy control participants did not 
differ on current BMI (F(1,47)=2.09, p=0.155); however, collapsing across both clinical 
groups, participants with current or previous anorexia significantly differed from 
healthy controls (F(1,48)=16.88, p=0.002). For lowest BMI, there was an overall effect of 
group membership (F(2,46)=47.28, p < 0.0001) and a significant difference between both 
clinical groups and the healthy controls (AN vs. HC: F(1,46)=70.60, p<0.0001, WR vs. HC: 
F(1,46)=67.65, p<0.0001, (AN + WR) vs. HC: F(1,46)=94.54, p<0.001). In contrast, the 
difference between weight-restored participants and those with current anorexia was 
not significant (F(1,46)=0.10, p=0.758), indicating a similar level of previous symptom 
severity in our weight-restored participants as compared to the current symptom 
severity in our currently-ill participants.  
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For the tests of current eating disorder symptoms, all groups significantly 
differed on each of the EDE-Q subscales (Restraint: F(2,49)= 37.28, R2=0.603, p<0.001; AN 
vs. HC: F(1,49)=73.41, p<0.0001, AN vs. WR: F(1,49)=27.75, p<0.0001,  WR vs. HC: 
F(1,49)=10.40, p<0.0022, (AN + WR) vs. HC: F(1,49)=46.80, p<0.0001. Eating Concern: 
F(2,49)= 43.98, R2=0.642, p<0.0001; AN vs. HC: F(1,49)=86.33, p<0.0001, AN vs. WR: 
F(1,49)=33.77, p<0.0001, WR vs. HC: F(1,49)=11.55, p=0.001, (AN + WR) vs. HC: 
F(1,49)=54.19, p<0.0001. Shape Concern: F(2,49)= 55.98, R2=0.696, p<0.0001; AN vs. HC: 
F(1,49)=109.62, p<0.0001, AN vs. WR: F(1,49)=43.93, p<0.0001, WR vs. HC: F(1,49)=14.05, 
p=0.0005, (AN + WR) vs. HC: F(1,49)=68.03, p<0.0001. Weight Concern: F(2,49)=57.24, 
R2=0.700, p<0.0001; AN vs. HC: F(1,49)=114.29, p<0.0001, AN vs. WR: F(1,49)=33.52, 
p<0.0001, WR vs. HC: F(1,49)=23.22, p<0.0001, (AN + WR) vs. HC: F(1,49)=80.96, p<0.0001. 
Global: F(2,49)= 72.24, R2=0.747, p<0.001; AN vs. HC: F(1,49)=142.73, p<0.0001, AN vs. 
WR: F(1,49)=51.86, p<0.0001, WR vs. HC: F(1,49)=21.56, p<0.0001, (AN + WR) vs. HC: 
F(1,49)=92.63, p<0.0001). See Table 10. 
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Table 10: Eating disorder pathology (SD) by group. Significance tests (p<0.05): a=AN vs. 
HC; b=AN vs. WR, c=WR vs. HC, d= (AN+WR) vs. HC. 
 AN 
Mean (SD) 
WR 
Mean (SD) 
HC 
Mean (SD) 
Total 
Mean (SD) 
Weight History 
• Current BMI 
• Lowest BMI 
 
17.63 (1.28) 
14.85 (1.72) 
 
21.67 (2.12) 
15.08 (1.76) 
 
23.12 (2.12) 
20.66 (2.30) 
 
20.82 (3.68) a,b,d 
17.09 (3.35) a,c,d 
EDE-Q Scores 
• Restraint 
• Eating Concern 
• Shape Concern 
• Weight Concern 
• Global 
 
4.21 (1.22) 
4.94 (2.61) 
4.89 (0.84) 
4.58 (0.92) 
4.33 (0.76) 
 
2.19 (1.17) 
 3.59 (2.65) 
2.63 (1.17) 
2.60 (1.27) 
2.23 (1.08) 
 
0.97 (0.96) 
2.39 (2.59) 
1.38 (0.92) 
0.98 (0.73) 
0.90 (0.66) 
 
2.43 (1.74) a-d 
3.62 (2.77) a,d 
2.93 (1.75) a-d 
2.68 (1.78) a-d 
2.46 (1.65)a-d 
 
In addition to examining eating disorder symptoms, we also investigated 
changes in temperament and character. For the harm avoidance subscale of the TCI, 
there was a significant overall effect of group membership (F(2,49)=8.92, R2=0.267, 
p=0.0005). Both clinical groups differed from healthy controls (AN vs. HC: F(1,49)=16.96, 
p=0.0001  WR vs. HC, F(1,49)=7.97, p=0.007, (AN + WR) vs. HC: F(1,49)=16.21 p=0.0002), 
but did not differ from each other (F(1,49)=1.63, p=0.208), indicating that increased 
sensitivity to harm does not depend on malnutrition. There was no significant effect of 
group membership for novelty seeking (F(2,48) = 1.47, p=0.240), self-transcendence 
(F(2,48)= 0.19, p=0.831), persistence (F(2,48)=1.24, p=0.298), or cooperativeness 
(F(2,46)=0.28, p=0.760); however, there was an overall effect of group membership for 
reward dependence (F(2,47)=3.54, p=0.037), with follow-up tests indicating a difference 
between weight-restored and currently-ill participants (F(1,47)= 7.08, p=0.011). For self-
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directedness, the overall model was significant (F(2,48)=8.70, R2 =0.266, p=0.0006) as were 
the contrasts between the currently-ill participants and controls (F(1,48)=16.45, p=0.0002), 
between participants with current anorexia and weight-restored participants 
(F(1,48)=8.23, p=0.006), and between clinical participants (AN + WR) and controls 
(F(1,48)=9.17, p=0.004). The difference between weight-restored participants and controls 
was not significant (F(1,48)=1.41, p=0.241). See Table 11.  
To explore potential differences in social dysfunction, we tested for effects of 
group membership on overall AQ scores as well as in each of the three AQ subscales 
(i.e., social skills, details/patterns, and communication/mindreading). The full model for 
overall AQ scores was significant (F(2,49)=5.97, R2 = 0.196, p=0.005). In the contrasts, 
participants with current anorexia did not differ from weight-restored participants 
(F(1,49)=1.67, p=0.202), but all other group comparisons were significant (AN vs. HC: 
F(1,49)=11.68, p=0.001, WR vs. HC: F(1,49)=4.44, p=0.040, (AN + WR) vs. HC: 
F(1,49)=10.28, p=0.002). For the AQ social skills subscale, there was a significant effect of 
group membership (F(2,49)= 4.16, R2=0.145, p<0.021) with participants with current 
anorexia differing from healthy controls (F(1,49)=8.32, p=0.006) and aggregated clinical 
participants differing from healthy controls (F(1,49)= 6.05, p=0.175). No group 
differences emerged for either the details and patterns subscale or the communication 
and mind reading subscale of the AQ, suggesting that autism-like symptoms associated 
with AN are specifically related to social deficits. See Table 11.  
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Table 11: Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) scores and Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ) scores by group. Significance tests (p<0.05): a=AN vs. HC; 
b=AN vs. WR, c=WR vs. HC, d= (AN+WR) vs. HC. 
 AN 
Mean (SD) 
WR 
Mean (SD) 
HC 
Mean (SD) 
Total 
Mean (SD) 
 
TCI 
• Harm Avoidance 
• Novelty Seeking 
• Reward 
Dependence 
• Cooperativeness 
• Self-Directedness 
• Self-
Transcendence 
• Persistence 
 
 
21.94 (6.63) 
17.82 (7.98) 
14.76 (3.99) 
 
36.00 (3.65) 
22.71 (9.31) 
15.35 (6.25)  
 
6.44 (1.71) 
 
 
19.24 (5.80) 
17.29 (5.96) 
18.24 (3.25) 
 
36.88 (3.28) 
31.24 (7.60) 
14.53 (6.99) 
 
6.18 (1.81) 
 
 
13.33 (6.09) 
20.88 (5.56) 
16.38 (4.13) 
 
36.75 (4.00) 
34.76 (9.00) 
14.00 (5.00) 
 
5.44 (2.17) 
 
 
18.08 (7.08) a,c,d 
18.67 (6.64) 
16.46 (4.00)b 
 
36.55 (3.59) 
29.57 (9.91) a,b,d 
14.63 (6.41)  
 
6.00 (1.93) 
AQ 
• Total Score 
• Social Skills 
• Details/ 
Patterns 
• Communication/ 
Mind Reading 
 
23.00 (5.83) 
4.94 (2.61) 
5.06 (2.33) 
 
1.76 (1.30) 
  
 
20.53 (6.06) 
3.59 (2.65) 
5.12 (1.83) 
 
2.00 (1.37) 
 
16.56 (4.79) 
2.39 (2.59) 
4.33 (2.30) 
 
1.28 (1.13) 
 
19.96 (6.09) a,c,d 
3.62 (2.77) a,d 
4.83 (2.16) 
 
1.67 (1.28)
  
 
5.3.2 Effect of Clinical Status and Temperament on Social 
Functioning  
To explore whether significant differences in affective biases, as indexed by the 
TCI, contributed to predictions of social deficits, we performed hierarchical regression 
analyses including clinical status ((AN + WR) vs. HC) at Step 1 and TCI subscale scores 
for harm avoidance and novelty seeking at Step 2. Because one participant failed to 
complete all items in the novelty seeking subscale, the total number of participants for 
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our hierarchical models vary (Hierarchical Model 1 (Harm Avoidance): n=52; Hierarchical 
Model 2 (Novelty Seeking): n=51; Hierarchical Model 3 (Harm Avoidance & Novelty Seeking): 
n=51). At Step 1 for Hierarchical Model 1, the effect of clinical status was significant (Full 
Model: F(1,50)= 5.90, R2=0.106, p=0.019; Clinical Status: t(50)=2.43, p=0.018). At Step 2, the 
inclusion of harm avoidance scores significantly improved model predictions for AQ 
social skills (Full Model: F(2,49)= 5.61, R2=0.1862, p<0.0064; Clinical Status: t(49)=1.11 
p=0.273, Harm Avoidance: t(49)=2.20, p=0.033; ΔF=4.86, ΔR2=0.082, p=0.032). A similar but 
negative effect was found for the inclusion of novelty seeking at Step 2 for Hierarchical 
Model 2 (Step 1, Full Model: F(1,49)=5.44, R2=0.10, p=0.024; Clinical Status: t(49)=2.33, 
p=0.024. Step 2, Full Model, F(2,49)= 9.11, R2=0.275, p=0.0004; Clinical Status: t(48)=1.69, 
p=0.098, Novelty Seeking: t(48)=-3.41, p=0.0013; ΔF=11.62, ΔR2=0.175, p=0.0013). Including 
both harm avoidance as well as novelty seeking also performed significantly better than 
clinical status alone (Hierarchical Model 3: Step 1, Full Model: F(1,49)=5.44, R2=0.10, 
p=0.024; Clinical Status: t(49)=2.33, p=0.024. Step 2, Full Model: F(3,47)= 7.63, R2=0.328, 
p=0.0003; Clinical Status: t(47)=0.62 p=0.540, Harm Avoidance: t(47)=1.91, p=0.062, 
Novelty Seeking: t(47)=-3.17, p=0.0027; ΔF=7.96, ΔR2=0.228, p=0.0011). The inclusion of 
novelty seeking in addition to harm avoidance and clinical status resulted in 
significantly better predictions of AQ social skills (ΔF=10.03, p=0.003), and the inclusion 
of harm avoidance showed a trend towards better performance than a model including 
only novelty seeking and clinical status (ΔF=3.66, p=0.062). See Table 12.  
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Table 12: Hierarchical models for clinical status, harm avoidance, and novelty 
seeking on social skills. [* Indicates p<0.05]. 
 Unstandardized 
Estimate  (SE) 
Standardized 
Estimate (SE) 
 
t-value 
Hierarchical Model 1 
Step 1 
• Intercept 
• Clinical Status 
Step 2 
• Intercept 
• Clinical Status 
• Harm Avoidance 
 
 
2.41 (0.65)  
1.88 (0.77) 
   
3.00 (0.66) 
0.95 (0.85)  
0.12 (0.06)  
 
 
0 
0.33 
 
0 
0.16  
0.33 
 
 
3.83* 
2.43*  
 
4.53* 
1.11 
2.20* 
ΔR2 =0.08 ΔF=4.86 p=0.03 
Hierarchical Model 2 
Step 1 
• Intercept 
• Clinical Status 
Step 2 
• Intercept 
• Clinical Status 
• Novelty Seeking 
 
 
2.41 (0.65)  
1.85 (0.79) 
   
2.81 (0.60) 
1.25 (0.74)  
-0.18 (0.05)  
 
 
0 
0.32 
 
0 
0.21 
-0.43 
 
 
3.72* 
2.33*  
 
4.69*  
1.69 
-3.41*  
ΔR2 =0.18 ΔF=11.62 p=0.001 
Hierarchical Model 3 
Step 1 
• Intercept 
• Clinical Status 
Step 2 
• Intercept 
• Clinical Status 
• Harm Avoidance 
• Novelty Seeking 
 
 
2.41 (0.65)  
1.85 (0.79) 
   
3.31 (0.64)  
0.51 (0.82) 
0.10 (0.05)  
-0.17 (0.05)  
 
 
0 
0.32 
 
0 
0.09 
0.27 
-0.39 
 
 
3.72* 
2.33*  
 
5.18* 
0.62 
1.91 
-3.17* 
ΔR2 =0.23 ΔF=7.96 p=0.01 
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5.3.3 Mediating Role of Temperament on Disordered Eating and 
Social Functioning  
In addition to exploring the relationship between clinical group and personality, 
we also wanted to examine how individual differences in current eating disorder 
symptoms related to social and affective factors. To do this, we tested whether novelty 
seeking or harm avoidance mediated the relationship between global EDE-Q scores and 
AQ social skills scores. Results indicated that in Mediation Model 1 (Harm Avoidance) 
there was a direct effect of global EDE-Q on AQ social skills (path c: β=0.620, t(50)=2.81, 
p=0.007). There was also an effect of global EDE-Q on harm avoidance (path a: β=2.522, 
t(50)=5.15, p<0.001). When both harm avoidance and global EDE-Q scores were included, 
there was a trend for harm avoidance to predict AQ social skills (path b: β=0.114, 
t(50)=1.83, p=0.074), but the effect of Global EDE-Q on AQ social skills scores was no 
longer significant (path c’: β=0.332, t(50)=1.25, p=0.219). The bootstrap analysis revealed a 
significant indirect effect of harm avoidance on AQ social skills (indirect effect (Δβ) = 
0.287, 95% confidence interval=[0.054, 0.582]), with harm avoidance mediating 46.4% of 
the total effect. Thus, harm avoidance fully mediated the relationship between global 
EDE-Q and AQ social skills. See Figure 10. 
  
Figure 10: Mediation Model 1. 
Examination Questionnaire
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ); however, the inclusion of harm avoidance scores fully 
mediates the relationship b
 
In Mediation Model 
on AQ social skills (path c: β=0.612, 
AQ social skills, however,
the model including both global EDE
significantly associated with AQ social skills (path b: β=
c’: β=-0.504, t(49)=2.50, p=0.016), but
(Δβ) = 0.109, 95% confidence interval = [
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Global scores on the Eating Disorder 
 (EDE-Q) predict scores on the social skills subscale of the 
etween EDE-Q and AQ. 
2 (Novelty Seeking), there was a direct effect of global EDE
t(49)=2.74, p=0.009). The effect of novelty seeking on 
 was not significant (path a: β=-0.591, t(49)=-1.05, 
-Q and novelty seeking, both variables were 
-0.184, t(49)=-3.64, 
 the indirect effect was not significant (indirect effect 
-0.128, 0.405]).  
 
-Q 
p=0.300). In 
p=0.0006; path 
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5.4 Discussion 
A domain-general theory of affect posits that disturbances in core affective 
processing should manifest as disruptions across multiple psychological domains. Prior 
literature indicates that women with AN experience disturbances in the overall 
processing of affective information whereby core affective signals are both heightened 
and experienced as subjectively aversive. This bias in core affective processing, given a 
domain-general model of affect, should also be associated with increased aversion to 
social stimuli. To test this hypothesis, in the current study we examined the associations 
among eating disorder symptoms, affective biases in temperament, and social 
functioning. 
Replicating previous findings, both currently-ill and weight-restored participants 
showed elevated levels of harm avoidance (Fassino et al., 2002; Klump et al., 2004; 
Klump et al., 2000), suggesting that individuals with AN show an increase in threat and 
harm sensitivity that is not dependent on being currently underweight. In contrast, we 
did not find evidence to support the conclusion that women with AN are lower overall 
in novelty seeking. A meta-analysis of previous studies using the TCI indicated that 
lower novelty seeking is a common but inconsistent finding in participants with AN 
(Harrison, O’Brien, et al., 2010). Thus, the small sample size in our study may have 
prevented the detection of subtle changes in reward sensitivity in clinical participants. 
Our results did, however, indicate a positive association between novelty seeking and 
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social functioning. Therefore, to the extent that patients show the trait of reduced 
novelty seeking, interventions that improve reward motivation may also show 
concomitant improvements in social functioning.  
Prior studies have shown that women and adolescents with AN demonstrate 
higher levels of autism symptoms (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013; Hambrook et al., 2008). 
Here, we replicated that finding, showing that women with a current or previous 
diagnosis of AN have elevated total scores on the AQ as compared to healthy controls. 
Yet we did not find evidence for a categorical increase in all autism like traits (i.e., in 
each of the three AQ factors), but instead showed selective deficits in social functioning. 
Given a domain-general model of affect, social deficits in AN may arise from more 
fundamental disturbances in the processing of affect. Based on prior literature pointing 
both to heightened threat sensitivity (Harrison, Tchanturia, et al., 2010) and sensory 
sensitivity (Zucker et al., 2013) as well as disrupted reward processing in AN (Harrison, 
O’Brien, et al., 2010; Kaye et al., 2013), we explored whether changes in affective 
experiences could explain variance in AQ social skills scores above and beyond clinical 
status alone. Hierarchical models including either harm avoidance, novelty seeking, or 
both were significantly better at predicting social skills deficits than models including 
only clinical status. Taking a dimensional approach, the current degree of eating 
disorder symptoms across all participants was associated with social deficits; however, 
this association was fully mediated by the inclusion of scores on the harm avoidance 
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subscale of the TCI. Thus, supporting a domain-general account of affective processing, 
individuals that demonstrate more severe disruptions in eating behavior may 
demonstrate a constellation of related affective disruptions including increased threat 
sensitivity and social anxiety. This conclusion is consistent with other studies indicating 
that biases in affective processing can account for aspects of social deficits in AN (e.g., 
Adenzato, Todisco, & Ardito, 2012; Hambrook, Brown, & Tchanturia, 2012; Harrison, 
Sullivan, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2009).  
Neuroscientific data point toward a potential mechanism whereby biases in 
threat processing result in social dysfunction in AN. The insular cortex is known to 
encode core affective processes such as interoception (Craig, 2009; Craig, 2002) and 
physical pain (Brooks, Zambreanu, Godinez, Craig, & Tracey, 2005; Mazzola, Isnard, 
Peyron, Guénot, & Mauguière, 2009; Wiech et al., 2010). Yet studies in the field of social 
neuroscience have demonstrated that neural structures responsible for processing 
physical pain are also responsible for processing social pain (Dewall et al., 2010; 
Eisenberger et al., 2003; Eisenberger, 2012). Thus, alterations in the processing of bodily 
signals could also contribute to the pattern of increased sensitivity to social threat 
(Harrison, Tchanturia, et al., 2010) and heightened fear of negative social evaluation 
(Deboer et al., 2013; Gilbert & Meyer, 2005a, 2005b) associated with disordered eating.  
In sum, our results suggest that social and interpersonal dysfunction in AN can 
be accounted for by changes in core affect. Potentially due to heightened sensory and 
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interoceptive reactivity, patients with AN become hyper-vigilant to threatening 
information in the environment. This results not only in a tendency to avoid primary 
reinforcers such as food, but also to withdraw from social situations. As a result, patients 
with AN fail to develop socioemotional expertise and show an increase in social 
cognitive dysfunctions mirroring those displayed in autism spectrum disorders.  
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6. Discussion 
Constructionist models of emotion hypothesize that emotion is built out of basic 
psychological ingredients that in specific combination, produce discrete emotions. One 
prominent constructionist theory (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012) posits that emotion is 
comprised of two major properties, core affect and conceptualization. Core affect is defined 
as reactions arising from fluctuations in the state of the body that are subjectively 
experienced as valence (i.e., hedonic value) and arousal. Conceptualization, which is 
supported by other cognitive processes such as language and executive attention, helps 
situate the experience of core affect in context by drawing on knowledge of the world, 
prior learning, and current goals. It is through conceptualization that an individual is 
able to categorize and create meaning from core affective reactions as they pertain to the 
current circumstances.  
Notably, while core affect and conceptualization are not specific to any particular 
emotion category, neither are they specific to emotion in general (Barrett, 2009). Both 
core affect and conceptualization are fundamental processes that contribute not only to 
emotion, but also to the construction of subjective reactions to reward and social stimuli. 
That is, the basic properties contributing to the construction of affective processes are domain 
general. The studies in this dissertation address the overlap in fundamental 
psychological and neural processes underlying emotion, reward, and social functioning. 
I have used both a basic science approach as well as clinical investigations to 
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demonstrate that emotion, reward processing, and social functioning are built on a 
common foundation and as such, are inextricably linked.  
In Chapter 2, I presented a study investigating the overlap between emotion and 
reward processing, and demonstrated that the vmPFC is responsible for encoding value 
not simply across different reward modalities, but also for emotional stimuli. In addition 
to showing that aspects of core affect are shared across reward and emotional 
processing, I have also shown that disruptions to the fundamental building blocks of 
affect produce deficits that are not domain specific. Individuals with AN are 
characterized by decreased motivation to pursue reward and increased motivation to 
avoid harm (Harrison, O’Brien, et al., 2010). This profile is broadly suggestive of a skew 
in the experience of core affect, whereby individuals with the disorder are more likely to 
experience stimuli as aversive and less likely to experience them as appetitive. This bias 
in the processing of hedonic value may be due in part to disturbances in either the 
ability or willingness to process fluctuations in sensations arising from the body. These 
disturbances, combined with the inflexible use of emotion regulation and rigid 
behavioral control (i.e., disturbances in conceptualization), contribute to the 
development of disordered eating behaviors, but also to a range of social and emotional 
disturbances.  
In Chapter 4, I showed that women with a history of AN show ongoing 
pathological eating as well as increased social anxiety. Moreover, I demonstrated that 
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the degree of eating-related psychopathology is related to differential social processing 
in the neural mechanisms of core affect. In Chapter 5, I expanded on these results by 
examining the relationship between aversive temperament and social dysfunction. In 
the following sections, I will summarize the findings from each of these studies and 
discuss their relevance to a domain-general theory of affective processing. 
6.1 Summary of Findings and Their Relevance to a Domain-
General Constructionist Model of Affect 
Previous research points to two conflicting accounts of the role of the vmPFC in 
affective processing. The field of neuroeconomics has strongly implicated the vmPFC in 
encoding reward value (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). In contrast, studies of negative emotion 
regulation suggest that this region is important for controlling affective responses 
(Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011). Because most studies of emotion regulation 
focus only on negative emotional responses, it is impossible to determine from these 
studies whether the vmPFC activation elicited by emotion regulation is the result of 
cognitive control or a shift in the value of emotional stimuli when they move from a 
more negative to a more neutral (and thereby more positive) state.  
In Chapter 2, I presented a study in which I investigated the neural mechanisms 
of emotional valuation and regulation. Two independent experimental samples of 
participants performed a cognitive reappraisal task while undergoing functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The experience of positive emotions activated the 
vmPFC, while the regulation of positive emotions led to relative decreases in vmPFC 
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activation. During the experience of positive emotions, vmPFC activation tracked 
participants’ own subjective ratings of the valence of stimuli. Furthermore, vmPFC 
activation also tracked normative valence ratings of the stimuli when participants were 
asked to experience their emotions, but not when asked to regulate them. A separate 
analysis of the predictive power of vmPFC on behavior indicated that even after 
accounting for normative stimulus ratings and condition, increased signal in the vmPFC 
was associated with more positive valence ratings. Collectively, these results suggest 
that the vmPFC encodes a domain-general value signal that tracks the value of not only 
of external rewards, but also emotional stimuli. In this way, the vmPFC encodes a 
domain-general signal for hedonic value.  
One of the critical points of the constructionist model of emotion is that 
emotional responses are situated in context. That is, the subjective emotional response 
that is ultimately experienced depends on prior learning and current goals. In the study 
presented in Chapter 2, on half of all trials, participants were asked to attempt to alter 
their emotional responses via regulation. This goal of altering affective responses is also 
reflected in vmPFC activation. When participants were asked to reappraise, they were 
highly successful, assigning a neutral rating (i.e., a 4 or a 5) on the overwhelming 
majority of trials. This flattening of the subjective behavioral reports corresponded to a 
vmPFC response that was also essentially flat. Thus, the vmPFC encodes core affect in 
that it represents hedonic value; however, the representation of hedonic value in the 
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vmPFC does not correspond to the objective value of stimuli but rather to a subjectively 
encoded hedonic value that also incorporate aspects of conceptualization.  
In addition to basic science approaches, the study of psychiatric disorders offers 
a unique opportunity to investigate how a system works by elucidating the ways in 
which it breaks down. At face value, AN seems to be a disorder of reward function. 
Individuals with AN are frequently described as ascetic (Fassino et al., 2006), and they 
eschew food in favor of longer-term weight loss goals (Kaye et al., 2009). Yet, consistent 
with a domain-general account of affective processing, individuals with AN also 
experience profound disturbances in social and interpersonal functioning. In Chapter 4, 
I presented a study probing the neural mechanisms of affective disturbance in AN and 
how the engagement of these mechanisms is different during social processing. In this 
study, weight-restored women with a history of AN and healthy control women 
underwent fMRI while they viewed images of female faces, female bodies, and 
scrambled images. They also completed survey measures to index current eating 
disorder symptoms and social functioning.  
Results indicated that women with a history of AN showed increased anxiety 
about social evaluation and elevated levels of disordered eating. Irrespective of group, 
social anxiety explained the current level of eating disorder symptoms, suggesting that 
social dysfunction may be a predisposing or maintaining factor for disordered eating. 
Clinical participants also showed differences in both cognitive and perceptual regions of 
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the brain when viewing images of bodies. Furthermore, all participants’ current level of 
eating disorder symptom severity was associated with increased activation in the insula 
when viewing faces. These results point to ongoing neural and behavioral disturbances 
in social functioning in AN even after recovery.  
The constructionist model of emotion implicates the insula in core affect 
(Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012), but more specifically in attention 
directed to the body. The insula may track changes in bodily homeostasis, signaling the 
presence of salient stimuli in the current environment. This information is then used to 
control behavior based on the assessment of salient stimuli (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). 
Changes in insular processing have frequently been observed in both currently-ill and 
recovered patients with AN (see Table 1). Moreover, women with AN display changes 
in somatosensory (Keizer et al., 2011, 2012) and interoceptive perception (Pollatos et al., 
2008). Thus, one of the fundamental changes in AN is in the ability to use information 
arising from the body to guide behavior. There is debate as to whether this deficit arises 
due to a primary inability to sense interoceptive changes (e.g., Pollatos et al., 2008) or 
due to an avoidance of interoceptive sensations resulting from heightened visceral 
reactivity (Zucker et al., 2013). Regardless of the nature of the disturbance, a domain-
general account of affective processing would posit that disruptions in the fundamental 
bases of core affect would disrupt processing across affective domains. Indeed, 
disruptions in insular function in AN have been observed in response to physical stimuli 
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(Strigo et al., 2013) and rewards (Wagner et al., 2008) as well as emotionally evocative 
stimuli (Miyake et al., 2010). In the study presented in Chapter 4, eating disorder 
symptom severity was associated with increased response in the insula to face images. 
The current level of eating disorder symptoms was also associated with increased 
anxiety over social evaluation. Thus, increased insular response to faces in individuals 
with high levels of disordered eating might reflect a visceral response to social stimuli 
that tags these stimuli as threatening more or less automatically. This could explain 
previous data demonstrating that patients have an attentional bias towards threatening 
faces (Harrison, Tchanturia, et al., 2010) and a tendency to report greater social anxiety 
(Hinrichsen et al., 2003).   
Chapter 5 builds on this hypothesis by exploring the relationship between social 
dysfunction and affective temperament. High levels of harm avoidance and low levels of 
novelty seeking have been observed in patients with AN (Harrison, O’Brien, et al., 2010). 
These findings suggests that—when considering core affective responses as falling along 
a continuous scale of valence ranging from highly negative to highly positive—
individuals with AN experience stimuli as skewed towards the negative end of the scale. 
Given that social situations are fundamentally affective in nature, a bias in the 
processing in core affect could explain interpersonal difficulties in AN. In the study 
presented in Chapter 5, healthy control women, women with a current diagnoses of AN 
and women with a previous diagnoses of AN but who were currently weight restored 
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completed survey measures of social functioning and temperament and character. 
Results indicated that both harm avoidance and novelty seeking contributed to 
predictions of social dysfunction (in different directions). Furthermore, variation in 
harm avoidance fully mediated the relationship between current eating disorder 
symptoms and social skills deficits as indexed by the autism spectrum quotient. These 
results suggest that increased harm sensitivity may contribute to the development and 
maintenance of social dysfunction in AN. In our sample, we did not find evidence that 
women with current or past AN were different from control women in novelty seeking; 
however, our analyses did indicate that novelty seeking was negatively associated with 
social dysfunction. Albeit less consistently that increased harm avoidance, lower novelty 
seeking has been observed in women with AN (Harrison, O’Brian, et al., 2010). Thus, a 
general behavioral profile of increased threat sensitivity and less appetitive drive may 
contribute towards the development of both disordered eating and poor interpersonal 
functioning.     
The evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5 supports the conclusion that patients 
with AN experience consistent and domain-general disruptions in affective processing, 
with affective stimuli frequently being experienced as emotionally aversive regardless of 
whether they are social, emotional, or reward-related. Such a bias could account for the 
avoidant behavior these patients demonstrate across a wide range of circumstances. For 
example, women with AN report an unwillingness to experience emotion (Merwin et al., 
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2013) as well as sensory sensations (Zucker et al., 2013). Furthermore, they frequently 
avoid interpersonal conflict (Lattimore, Wagner, & Gowers, 2000) and are socially 
inhibited in general (Carter, Kelly & Norwood, 2012).  
Broadly, these results suggest that disruptions in the subjective experience of 
core affect are responsible for avoidant behavior in AN. Yet how domain-general 
affective avoidance might emerge in AN is not well understood. A view that has gained 
growing support is that women with AN experience heightened visceral and 
interoceptive sensitivity (Kaye et al., 2009; Zucker et al., 2013), but an increase in the 
intensity of bodily signals does not necessarily mean these signals will be subjectively 
experienced as aversive. In normal individuals, highly arousing visceral sensations are 
often experienced as pleasant and even positively reinforcing. The sensation that one’s 
stomach is dropping just as a rollercoaster car begins its descent is a feeling that no 
doubt drives many regular amusement park goers. In these cases, roller coaster 
enthusiasts interpret this intensely visceral sensation as hedonically positive, in part 
because of its association with positive outcomes. The roller coaster enthusiast knows—
unless she is attending the North Carolina State Fair—that she will be safe. Furthermore, 
she experiences the ride as thrilling, an opportunity to display her own bravery, and a 
chance to bond with her social group.  
In contrast to this example, patients with AN may have learned to associate 
bodily sensations—hunger, satiety, sexual arousal—with negative outcomes. Given the 
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broader cultural context in which dieting is encouraged and thinness is prized, 
individuals who are predisposed to develop disordered eating may associate feelings of 
fullness or digestion with guilt, anxiety, and shame. As these associations are 
strengthened over time, bodily sensations may begin to trigger negative affective 
responses rapidly, potentially even before food has been consumed. In an effort to 
reduce the negative affect associated with interoceptive processing, patients with AN 
may attempt to consciously control the bodily states they experience through dietary 
restraint.  Such efforts may be positively reinforced in at least two ways. First, by 
controlling consumption, patients who develop disordered eating reduce the negative 
feelings that arise when they consume food. Over time, once a starvation state is 
achieved, visceral signals of any kind may be reduced, which results in an overall 
reduction in negative affect. Second, when patients first begin to lose weight, they may 
be subtly or overtly encouraged by friends and family, which reinforces the behavior. 
Once this tendency to control emotional reactivity through starvation has become 
habitual, however, the behavior may be less sensitive to changes in the nature of the 
feedback elicited by it. Thus, by the time patients are severely underweight, negative 
feedback from peers, family members, and healthcare provides may do little to alter 
behaviorally and neurally engrained disordered eating. 
Self-regulation also may contribute to the domain-general affective biases 
observed in AN. Patients with AN have long-term goals to lose weight and control 
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dietary intake and may engage in maladaptive emotion regulatory strategies that help 
them achieve these goals. While some of these emotion regulatory attempts may be 
consciously deployed, others may be employed outside conscious awareness. For 
comparison, consider socioeomotional functioning in older adults. As people age, they 
perceive time as limited, and begin to prioritize social and emotional goals (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). To achieve goals to optimize emotional well-being, older 
adults engage in a number of emotion regulatory strategies that allow them to 
preferentially process negative stimuli less, resulting in the widely-cited “positivity 
bias” observed in memory, attention, and decision making (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; 
Fung & Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Reed & Carstensen, 2012). The 
bulk of evidence on the positivity bias suggests that emotion regulation strategies that 
result in the positivity bias are largely unconscious (e.g., Allard, Wadlinger, & 
Isaacowitz, 2010; Mather & Knight, 2005). A similar process may be at work in AN, 
whereby weight loss goals are chronically activated, and self-regulatory strategies that 
increase the likelihood of achieving these goals are automatically and chronically 
engaged. Given that the neural mechanisms for affective processing are shared, these 
chronically-activated  strategies to regulate food intake may have unintended 
consequences for other affective functions. That is, strategies that may increase aversive 
reactions to food may also contribute to increased withdrawal responses to emotional 
and social stimuli. 
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6.2 Applications for the Domain-General Constructionist Model 
of Affect to Other Psychiatric Disorders 
One of the major goals of this dissertation is to understand how a domain-
general theory of affective processing can account for disruptions in AN; however, as I 
alluded to in Chapter 3, this theory has relevance for a broad range of psychiatric 
disorders. Many psychiatric disorders are characterized by disturbances in affective 
processing, and these disturbances tend to impact functioning across many 
psychological domains. Furthermore, there is often a high degree of comorbidity 
between disorders with conceptually similar disruptions in affective processing. Patients 
with major depressive disorder and anxiety disorders show a similar pattern of 
behavioral biases whereby both groups show increases in negative affectivity (Watson, 
Clark, & Carey, 1988), increased attention to negative stimuli (Leyman, De Raedt, 
Schacht, & Koster, 2007; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000), and maladaptive rumination 
(Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010). Moreover, both groups show increased activation in 
regions of the brain involved in core affect (i.e., in the insula) (van Tol et al., 2012) and 
decreased activation in regions thought to be important for conceptualization (i.e., the 
prefrontal cortex) (Beutel, Stark, Pan, Silbersweig, & Dietrich, 2010; Taylor & Liberzon, 
2007). Thus, consistent with a domain-general model of affect, across similar psychiatric 
conditions the neural and psychological biases in affective processing are often 
analogous. 
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Classifying affective disturbances in psychiatric conditions as general 
disruptions that span all affective domains might initially make the problem of treating 
psychological disorders seem intractable. However, upon deeper consideration, this 
conceptual approach could dramatically simplify the problem of treatment by pointing 
to areas of intervention that can improve functioning across domains. For example, 
women with AN often feel ambivalent about engaging in treatment (Colton & Pistrang, 
2004; Strober, 2004). As the nature of the disorder is such that patients experience intense 
fear of gaining weight, they may have little motivation to begin treatments that focus on 
altering eating behavior. In contrast, many patients with AN report a desire to improve 
interpersonal functioning and may be more willing to engage in treatments that 
specifically target social functioning (see Zucker et al., 2007 for a discussion). If the 
psychological and neural mechanisms responsible for affective processing in response to 
social as well as primary rewards are shared, psychological interventions that aim to 
improve how core affect is experienced and how these experiences are conceptualized in 
social situations may nonetheless improve affective functioning in response to food and 
the body as well. A similar approach may also be effective for other psychiatric 
disorders. For example, if patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder learn to routinely 
use emotion regulation strategies to alter their affective responses to stimuli other than 
those that trigger their specific obsessive thoughts or compulsive behaviors, as they 
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become skilled at employing such strategies, they may additionally begin improve their 
abilities to control their pathological thoughts and behaviors. 
6.3 Final Conclusions 
The framework proposed in this dissertation has broad relevance for 
understanding the fundamental building blocks of human affective experience. 
Regardless of the exact nature of an affectively charged stimulus, bodily responses that 
guide the intensity and valence of the response (i.e., core affect) as well as cognitive 
processes that interpret and manipulate the meaning of the stimulus in context (i.e., 
conceptualization) will contribute to the subjective feeling evoked by that stimulus, and 
ultimately, the behavioral response. Understanding how domain-general affective 
signals are encoded in the brain and how they manifest across psychological functions 
can lead to a better understanding of affective functioning in both healthy individuals as 
well as those with psychiatric impairments.  
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